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BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978A NEW APPROACH TO INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
AND THE ROLE OF THE SEC
Allen F. Corotto*
Irving H. Picard**
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 consolidates chapters X and XI of the Chandler Act and adopts a "disclosure" approach to business reorganization. This Article analyzes the effect
of these changes on public investor protection andfocuses upon the
participation of the SEC in reorganization proceedings. The authors conclude that the automatic standing given the SEC in reorganization proceedings will provide the Commission with opportunities to function as a constructive force in securing adequate
disclosure for the protection of public investors.
Business reorganization proceedings under the bankruptcy laws invariably
involve complicated issues of financial analysis and disclosure that affect, in
the substantial cases, significant public investor interests. 1 In the 1930's,
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) "as a special agency charged with the function of protecting the investing public" 2 under the federal securities acts. It also wrote into chapter

* Chief, Bankruptcy Reorganization Section, Securities and Exchange Commission, San
Francisco, California.
** Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. Subsequent to the submission of this Article, in May, 1979, Mr. Picard
was appointed United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors' colleagues
on the staff of the Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission supported the Senate version of the reorganization
chapter in S. 2266 (95th Cong.), which included special provisions designed for a company
whose securities are publicly held. As part of the House-Senate compromise leading to the
enactment of H.R. 8200, as amended (Pub. L. No. 95-598), those provisions were deleted.
1. The securities of most, if not all, large debtors are held by public investors who are
creditors or stockholders, or both. Thus, their securities probably will have been the subject of
a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976), processed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), and subject to the
continuing disclosure requirements under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1976). The contents of this Article will primarily relate to the reorganization of
these types of public entities.
2. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965). In this case, the Court
was faced with the question of whether respondent's attempted corporate rehabilitation under
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X of the Chandler Act of 19383 the procedural means for SEC participation in bankruptcy corporate reorganization proceedings to provide similar
protection for public investors. 4 Thus, chapter X provided for Commission
5
intervention and involvement as a party in interest in such proceedings.
In 1952, chapter XI (the other chapter of the 1938 Act that addressed corporate rehabilitations) was amended to permit the Commission and others to
seek to transfer a case under that chapter to chapter X where public debts
were being adjusted, the number of public investors was great, and the adjustment was major. 6
As the United States Supreme Court characterized it, chapter X aimed to
"afford greater protection to creditors and stockholders by providing ...
impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganization
... through ... active participation of the SEC." 7 Having no financial
interest in the debtor or in the outcome of its reorganization, the SEC could
be an active party in the proceedings and thereby protect the interests of
widespread public investors. Additionally, it could aid the court and trustee,
if one was appointed, 8 in an advisory capacity in the approval and confirmathe old Bankruptcy Act, where the rights of widespread public investors would be affected,
should be conducted under chapter X of that Act or chapter XI. Id. at 600-03. The Court held
that where public debts were being adjusted, when the number of investors is great, they are
widespread and not closely associated with the debtor, and where the adjustment was major,
chapter X was the appropriate proceeding. Id. at 615.
3. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 208, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-99)) (repealed 1979) [hereinafter cited as Chandler Act, ch. -, - 52
Stat. - (1938) (repealed 1979)].
4. This was because chapter X was considered to be a public investor protection statute.
As the Supreme Court noted, "Itseems clear that in enacting Chapter X Congress had the
protection of public investors, and not trade creditors, primarily in mind." SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 614 (1938).
5. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 208, 52 Stat. 894 (1938) (repealed 1979).
6. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 328, as added by Act of July 7, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66
Stat. 432 (repealed 1979). This provision codified the Supreme Court's holding in SEC v. U.S.
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 (1940), permitting the Commission to seek a
transfer of the case to chapter X in order to prevent interference with its prescribed chapter X
functions "through improper resort to a chapter XI proceeding in violation of the public policy
of the Act."
Section 328 of chapter XI distinguished the two debtor relief proceedings. Chapter XI was
designed to focus on the interest of trade creditors, who needed a minimum of protection;
chapter X dealt with the pervasive reorganization of larger, publicly held corporations, in which
the speed and economy of chapter XI was less important than thoroughness and disinterest in
the public interest. Three Supreme Court cases reviewed the interrelationship of these two
chapters in determining which applied in a particular situation: SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956) (in determining the appropriateness of remedy under a chapter X or XI proceeding, the Court looked to
the one that would better serve the public and private interests involved); SEC v. United States
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459 (1940) (district court should have dismissed
chapter XI petition, thereby leaving debtor with opportunity to proceed under chapter X).
7. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965).
8. Under § 156 of former chapter X, all cases involving a debtor with $250,000 or more of
liabilities required the appointment of a disinterested trustee. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 156, 52
Stat. 888 (1938) (repealed 1979).
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tion of the reorganization plan. 9 Not the least significant of the SEC's
statutory duties involving the public interest was its examination of and advisory report to the court on any reorganization plan deemed worthy of
consideration and referred to the Commission. 10
With Congress' enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197811 (Reform Act), the bankruptcy laws have been substantially revised. For business
reorganizations, a new approach has been adopted: former chapters X and XI
are now consolidated into a single reorganization chapter-chapter 1112
and a disclosure approach, analogous to that under the securities laws, is
followed in lieu of the former approach involving scrutiny and approval of a
13
plan proposal's merits by the SEC and the court.
This Article focuses on the public-investor-protection aspects of the consolidated chapter 11 and the SEC's participation in that context. In addition
to formal SEC standing and its right to be heard, such important investor
protections as appointment of a disinterested trustee, creditor and equity
security holder committees, investigations and plan formulations, disclosure,
and confirmation standards are examined. Large public reorganization cases
involve a community of participants and affect substantial financial interests.
Where classes of publicly held debt and equity securities are concerned, a
reorganization case transcends the rules applicable to arm's length bargaining
and requires adherence to standards of conduct associated with fiduciary
transactions. 14 It is from this perspective that this Article is approached.

. 9. The SEC's role under § 208 of former chapter X was described as one "charged with a
responsibility to protect the public interest, the general interest of investors, and to serve in an
advisory capacity to the bankruptcy court." SEC v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1968)
(appellate court held that district court's denial of SEC's right to put forth questions on crossexamination was outside of court's authority).
10. The "purpose of... an SEC report in Chapter X was public investor protection." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 225, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-595].
11. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of
2, 7, 12, 15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 46, 48, 49 U.S.C.). The Bankruptcy Reform Act
was enacted on Nov. 6, 1978, and became effective in substantial part on October 1, 1979. The
heart of the Reform Act will be codified in title 11 of the United States Code. As this article was
prepared for publication, the most current codification of the Act was the 1978 second supplement to the United States Code, in which title 11 appears in the appendix. Throughout this
Article, all references to title 11 will be cited as 11 U.S.C. app. - § - (Supp. 11 1978).
12. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. II 1978).
13. Id. § 1125.
14. E.g., in Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945), the Supreme Court held stockholders, appealing a confirmation order in a chapter X reorganization proceeding, to a "representative responsibility" when they, in effect, sold their appeal for a cash payment. In a subsequent
action for an accounting brought by a shareholder, the Court said that even though they did not
formally seek to represent the class of shareholders, their "control of the common rights of all
the preferred stockholders imposed on [them] a duty fairly to represent these common rights."
Id. at 212.
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SEC

Like its predecessor, the new Act expressly provides for SEC participation
in chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. Section 1109(a) states: "The Securities and Exchange Commission may raise and may appear and be heard
on any issue in a case under this chapter."15 Previously, under chapter X,
the SEC did not have an automatic right to appear in a reorganization proceeding. To appear, it needed either judicial approval of a motion seeking
intervention or a request from the judge. 16 Also, while it was denied the
right of appeal from an order of a district judge, 17 it could and often did
participate in appeals initiated by other parties in interest.' 8 Under the
former chapter XI, on the other hand, the Commission did have a right of

15. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1109(a) (Supp. II 1978). The comparable provision in former chapter
X was § 208, which read:
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall, if requested by the judge, and
may, upon its own motion if approved by the judge, file a notice of its appearance
in a proceeding under this chapter. Upon the filing of such a notice, the Commission shall be deemed to be a party in interest, with the right to be heard on all
matters arising in such proceeding, and shall be deemed to have intervened in
respect of all matters in such proceeding with the same force and effect as if a
petition for that purpose had been allowed by the judge; but the Commission may
not appeal or file any petition for appeal in any such proceeding.
Chandler Act, ch. X, § 208, 52 Stat. 894 (1938) (repealed 1979). While former chapter XI had
neither an express general intervention provision nor prescribed statutory duties for the SEC,
§ 328 expressly permitted the Commission to intervene in the arrangement proceeding to seek a
transfer of the case to chapter X. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 328, as added by Act of July 7, 1952,
Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66 Stat. 432 (repealed 1979). However, in certain situations, the SEC did
intervene in chapter XI cases to enforce compliance with provisions of the federal securities
laws when deemed necessary. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 612-13
(1965) (the SEC was not limited solely to seek a transfer under § 328 but also was entitled to
intervene and be heard on other issues). In such instances, intervention was sought pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 24. See generally 43 SEC. ANN. REP. 264 (1977).
16. See Chandler Act, ch. X, § 208, 52 Stat. 894 (1938) (repealed 1979). For example, a
district court noted: "[A]t the request of the Court the Securities and Exchange Commission
was asked to intervene, which it did." In re St. Charles Hotel Co., 604 F. Supp. 322, 324 (D.N.J.
1945), order aff'd, 149 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court stated: "[N]either chapter
X nor chapter XI, in terms, gives a right of 'intervention,' but the Commission is authorized,
with the permission of the court, to appear in any chapter X proceedings." Its right to
appear under chapter XI was by way of intervention "governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure
and the general principles governing intervention." SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1940).
17. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 208, 52 Stat. 894 (1938) (repealed 1979). But this was not construed to prohibit review from rulings of a bankruptcy judge to a district judge, only from the
latter to the court of appeals. SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-210(c) stated that the SEC could "not
appeal to the court of appeals from any order of the district court."
18. See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1970) (as a party in the
lower court proceedings, the SEC could become a party to an appeal); Ashback v. Kirtley, 289
F.2d 159, 162 (8th Cir. 1961), noted in In re American Nat'l Trust, 426 F.2d 1059, 1066 n.6
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appeal, either from the denial of a section 328 transfer motion 19 or from an
order entered in a proceeding in which it had intervened generally or specifically as a party in interest.
Under the Reform Act, the participation of the SEC in corporate reorganization cases will stem from section 1109 (a) of chapter 11. No longer will the
Commission need to seek intervention or await court order into a case. It is
statutorily authorized to intervene at any time and raise and be heard on
any issue. 20 Section 1109(a) appears to be patterned after former law addressing the SEC's standing in reorganization cases. The Commission is seen
in an "advisory role" enabling the court "to balance the needs of public
security holders" against other "important public needs in a reorganization
case." 21 While the Commission may raise any issue on its own initiative, it
may also "appear and be heard on an issue that is raised by someone
else."

22

As in former chapter X, however, the SEC cannot "appeal from any
judgment, order, or decree entered in the [revised chapter 11] case." 23
The reason behind the rule is that "an appeal by an agency that [has] no
direct interest in the case when none of those with money involved can be
persuaded to take an appeal could cause delay to the detriment of the
debtor, the creditors, and the stockholders." 24 Further, while the Commission was denied the right of appeal under the old chapter X, it had sought
and obtained in several cases the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to pro25
tect and/or clarify the scope of its participation in reorganization cases.

(7th Cir. 1970). See also Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 420 n.3 (1968) (the
Commission was designated as a nominal appellee in an appeal even though its position may
have supported the appellant), noted in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S.
416, 419 n.8 (1972) (the SEC is "an unnamed respondent before this Court").
19. Most transfer motions were brought by the Commission. "Where a case originated in
Chapter XI, the application for transfer to Chapter X under § 328 was usually made by the
SEC." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 4.22(2), at 470 (14th ed. 1978). Much of the law addressing
whether chapter X or XI was appropriate for the rehabilitation of a particular debtor was a
result of appeals initiated by the Commission from lower court denials of its transfer motions.
20. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1109(a) (Supp. II 1978).
21. 124 CONG. REc. Hl1,100 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). The
participation of the SEC, as well as other creditor and shareholder interests, "will enable the
bankruptcy court to evaluate all sides of a position and to determine the public interest." Id.
22. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 404.
23. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1109(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
24. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 229. See also id. at 404, where it is stated:
"The section, following current law, denies the right of appeal to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It does not, however, prevent the Commission from joining or participating in an
appeal taken by a true party in interest. The Commission is merely prevented from initiating
the appeal in any capacity."
25. See, e.g., SEC v. Templar, 405 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1969) (writ denied); SEC v.
Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1968) (writ granted).
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The authors believe that in appropriate situations the Commission may be
expected to do so under chapter 11.
Under section 208 of chapter X, the SEC was deemed a "party in interest" enjoying the right to be heard on all matters that arose in the case.
There is no reason to assume that the Reform Act changes this perspective.
Even though section 1109(a) does not include that specific language, the
legislative history characterizes the SEC as a party in interest, as distinguished from a true party in interest-that is, one with a pecuniary interest, 26 such as a creditor or stockholder.
The SEC's participation in chapter X was considered one of the important
public investor protection features of that proceeding. The revised Act modifies the specific statutory duties prescribed by former chapter X for the
Commission to discharge, but, in other respects, preserves the Commission's
right to actively participate in all phases of chapter 11 cases. For example, in
connection with the disclosure related to a plan, the House Report noted the
nonapplicability of the securities acts' registration and proxy requirements,
administered by the SEC under the federal securities laws, and stated that
"certain [important] protection[s]" are provided so that "the public is
not left
entirely at the mercy of the debtor and its creditors." 27 The first such
protective device is that the court must approve the disclosure statement
before acceptances can be solicited. 28 The second is "that the Securities
and Exchange Commission and any other regulatory agency or officers whose
responsibility it is to enforce securities laws will have an absolute right to
appear and be heard on whether a disclosure statement contains adequate
information."

29

26. Section 1109(a), unlike § 208 of former chapter X, does not expressly refer to the SEC
as a "party in interest," and it has been said that "the Securities and Exchange Commission is
not a party in interest." 124 CONG. R~c. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards). That this omission and statement mean no more than to underscore the disinterested
advisory role of the Commission, which carries no right of appeal in reorganization cases, seems
clear. In the House Report's comment on the denial of a right to appeal in connection with the
disclosure statement, reference is made to the possible detrimental delay of "[an appeal by an
agency that had no direct interest in the case" when no one "with money involved can be
persuaded to take an appeal." H.R. REP,. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 229. Additionally, in
that same report on §§ 1109(a) and 1125(d), reference is made to a "true party in interest" in
distinguishing the SEC's standing and role. Id. at 404, 409.
The distinction, then, is between the advisory status of the SEC and the monetary interest
of others. Thus, for example, the House Report notes that "[b]y virtue of... 11 U.S.C. § 1109,"
the Commission . . . [is a] "part[y] in interest" for requesting the appointment of a trustee. Id.
at 403.
27. H.R. REP. No. 95-595 supra note 10, at 228.
28. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
29. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228. The House Report also states that "[t]heir
[SEC's or other regulatory agency's] arguments, on behalf of the public interest in an orderly
securities market will undoubtedly be heard and considered by the bankruptcy judges." Id.
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The SEC's involvement in chapter 11 cases should allow it to play an
important role in investor protection. 30 As a general participant with the
right to be heard on any issue, a disinterested voice will be brought to bear
on the many complicated matters that will arise, as they did under former
chapter X, in reorganizations under chapter 11. It is the authors' belief that
the Commission's participation as a general party in interest could continue
to be of considerable assistance to the courts and to the other parties concerned. 31
APPOINTMENT OF A DISINTERESTED TRUSTEE OR EXAMINER

In addition to allowing SEC participation in reorganization proceedings,
the Reform Act provides several other important devices to ensure public
investor protection. The first is the possible appointment of a disinterested
trustee or examiner. To understand the Act's approach to the use of this
device, it is necessary to review the role of the trustee under the 1938 law.
Under the former Bankruptcy Act, financially distressed corporations
could seek rehabilitation under two chapters, each designed to deal with
distinct and different economic needs, 32 and each "legally, mutually exclusive paths to attempted financial rehabilitation." 33 Chapter X was enacted
for the protection of public investors 34 and provided a means for a pervasive
reorganization, which could, and often did, require substantial changes in
the debtor's capitalization. Thus, outstanding secured and unsecured debt
and stock ownership, frequently involving public investor classes, were altered. Chapter X had certain procedural and substantive safeguards in the

30. Several of the important areas are discussed in later sections.
31. In In re St. Charles Hotel Co., 60 F. Supp. 322 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 149 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 738 (1945), the SEC appeared by direction of the court and presented the
evidence and argument to assist the court in determining whether the chapter X petition met
the good faith requirements of § 146 of that chapter. 60 F. Supp. at 325. Noting that only the
objecting creditors appeared in opposition to the petition and that other parties might have
been "apathetic to their own interests," because of "ignorance, laxity, lack of funds or otherwise," the court said the SEC "was set up to safeguard the rights of the investing public" and
its "recommendations must be considered with that object in mind." Id. at 327. In that regard,
the district court judge stated: "In this case the Securities and Exchange Commission serves the
useful purpose of presenting to the court an over-all view of the case which embraces the
interests of the aforementioned absent parties." Id.
Likewise, in In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a fee
case, the district court judge noted that the SEC "has been a party to this action since the
transfer to Chapter X pursuant to section 208 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 608," and "[i]ts help and
guidance . . . has been of great assistance to the court throughout these protracted proceedings"
and it "could be relied upon, when requested, 'to provide a disinterested perspective of the
events about which the court needed to be informed." Id. at 1260.
32. See, e.g., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603-07 (1965); SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 447 (1940).
33. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965).
34. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 422 (1972), citing SEC v.
American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 614 (1965).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:961

interest of investors. They included the mandatory appointment of a "disinterested" trustee as the "focal point" of the reorganization 35 in those cases

where the debtor's liabilities were $250,000 or more, 36 and close supervision
by the court over the administration of the estate. While speed and economy

were a statutory desideratum, under chapter X, they acceded to reasonable
assessment and investigation 3 7 -prerequisites
to the formulation of a reorganization plan by the trustee-so that the extensive restructuring con-

templated by that chapter could be successfully accomplished. 3
By contrast, chapter XI essentially provided for a simple composition between a debtor and its unsecured creditors, 39 primarily trade claimants. Because speed and economy ostensibly were the hallmarks of chapter XI, it
involved a summary procedure to facilitate the arrangement "with only a
bare minimum of independent control or supervision." 4 0 Thus, the debtor
generally was permitted to retain control of its assets and manage its own

affairs, 41 with no supervision by an independent trustee, 42 and retained for
itself the exclusive right to propose an arrangement. 43 A chapter XI arrangement could not affect secured claims absent actual consent of the secured creditors. 44 It also could not affect the outstanding stock of the

35. H.R. REP. No. 1409 to accompany H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1937).
36. Chandler Act, ch. X, §§ 156, 158, 52 Stat. 888 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R.
BANKR. P. 10-202(a), 10-202(c). Under § 158 and Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-202(c)(2), a person
was deemed not disinterested if he or she: (a) had been a creditor or stockholder of the debtor;
(b) had been an underwriter of any of the debtor's outstanding securities or, within five years of
the filing of the petition, had been an underwriter of any of the debtor's securities; (c) had
been, or, within two years of the filing of the petition, had been an employee, officer, or
director of the debtor, or an underwriter or an attorney for the debtor or such underwriter; or
(d) had, either directly or indirectly any other interest materially adverse to the interests of any
class of creditors or stockholders.
It is significant that those disqualifications did not presume dishonesty, but rather recognized the difficulty of determining, at the outset of the reorganization, the ability and character
of individuals associated with the debtor to serve in fiduciary positions as court-appointed officials. See Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963) (debtor was continued in possession because
its liabilities were less than $250,000).
37. In no event would the need for expediting reorganization proceedings justify abandoning
proper procedural and substantive standards. See Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,
450 (1968).
38. See text accompanying notes 142-59 infra.
39. Chandler Act, ch. XI, §§ 306(1), 307, 356, 52 Stat. 906, 910 (1938) (repealed 1979); SuP.
CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-63(1).
40. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965). See SEC v. United
States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1940).
41. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 342, 52 Stat. 909 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P.
11-18(b).
42. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 332, 52 Stat. 908 (1938) (repealed 1979). This section provided,
however, for the continuation in possession of a previously appointed trustee in bankruptcy in a
pending bankruptcy case. Id.
43. Id. § 323; Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-36(a).
44. R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 1976) (secured
creditor that received less than full face amount of debt allowed to participate in chapter XI
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debtor,4 5 although the issuance of stock in exchange for creditors' claims would
alter the degree of control and ownership of the old stockholders. 46
There were no automatic tests for determining the adequacy of chapter XI
or the need for relief under chapter X. The test used in practice was one of
determining "needs to be served." 47 For the larger and publicly held corporations, the proper avenue of relief could be obtained by a motion, under
section 328 of chapter XI and chapter XI rule 11-15(b), to transfer the case
to chapter X. 4 8 The Supreme Court had given pragmatic guidelines on this
subject. 49 Normally, when a debtor requiring rehabilitation had a substantial number of public investors, particularly where there was a large class of
investors who were creditors, it was held that chapter X was, as a general
rule, the proper avenue of relief 50 unless the debt adjustment was "minor,
consisting, for example, of a short extension of time for payment." 5 ' However,
in holding that neither the debtor's size nor its capital structure were necessarily controlling, the Supreme Court had pointed out in General Stores
Corp. v. Shlensky that "[a] large company with publicly held securities upay
have as much need for a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller
52
company."
When Congress first divided corporate reorganizations into chapters X and
XI in 1938, a hotly debated matter was the important question concerning
the mandatory appointment of a disinterested trustee. 53 In connection with

arrangement). See also 124 Coxe. REC. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY 8.01(3), at 168 & n.ll (14th ed. 1978).
45. In re Penn Central Co., 596 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1979) (appellate court modified district
court's ruling approving and confirming the amended plan of arrangement under chapter XI of
the Act); R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Texas
Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir. 1973) (bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction
in chapter XI proceeding to order surrender for cancellation of outstanding preferred stock of
corporation).
46. See Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc. v. Chipperfield, 457 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1972) (district court had
jurisdiction to control arrangement).
47. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).
48. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.. 379 U.S. 594, 613-15 (1965).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 613; In re Continental Inv. Corp., 586 F.2d 241 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, sub
nom Wallace v. SEC, 440 U.S. 980 (1979) (SEC's transfer motion granted); Norman Fin. &
Thrift Corp. v. SEC, 415 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1969) (SEC's motion to transfer to chapter X
granted); SEC v. People's Loan & Inv. Co., 410 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1969) (chapter X appropriate
proceeding where proposed arrangement could result in significant reduction in claims of
depositors/creditors); SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964)
(granted SEC motion to transfer to chapter X).
51. SEC. v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 614-19. See Barnes v. Alrac Corp.,
550 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1977) (deferral of time within which to pay in full principal on
notes, so that only timing of payments and receipt of post-petition interest was affected, "was
not so substantial as to outweigh the factors favoring Chapter XI treatment").
52. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).
53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1916]; H.R. REP. No. 1409 to accompany H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-44 (1937) [hereinafter
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its consideration of a consolidated reorganization chapter under the Reform
Act, Congress again wrestled with the question of the mandatory appointment
of a trustee. The House of Representatives determined not to require a trustee
in every case. 54 The Senate, on the other hand, initially was of the view
that a trustee should automatically be appointed in a case involving a "public
company," as that term was defined. 55 But it receded from the mandatory
trustee concept and agreed to a provision requiring the appointment of an
examiner, upon the request of a party in interest, in certain cases where no
trustee has been appointed. 56
About Congress' opting for this new approach, it was thought that displacement of management with a trustee would impose a rigid and formal
procedure, much like former chapter X, upon many cases where it is not
necessary-thereby sacrificing speed and simplicity. 57 Moreover, it was
said that certain chapter X provisions designed to protect public investors,
such as those calling for a mandatory trustee, were no longer necessary due,
in large part, "to the pervasive effect of the Federal securities laws and the
extraordinary success of the Securities and Exchange Commission in sensitizing both management and members of the bar to the need for full disclosure
58
and fair dealing in transactions involving publicly held securities."
Under these circumstances, Congress adopted a flexible approach to the
appointment of a trustee in reorganization cases, and opted for a case-bycase determination. 59 It leaves the debtor in possession of its business,
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1409]. It is not surprising that, over the years, litigation concerning which
chapter was applicable centered on this issue. The House Report states that "[i]n that issue [appointment of a trustee] lies much of the controversy surrounding conversion of a case from chapter XI te
chapter X." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 233.
54. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 232-34,
55. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978),
reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5795-96 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
95-989]; 124 CONG. REc.S14,719 (daily ed. Sept. 7,1978)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). For purposes of
chapter 11, §1101(3) of the Senate bill would have defined a"public company" as one having outstanding
debt of at least $5,000,000 (excluding liabilities for goods, services, or taxes) and "not less than one
thousand securities holders." S. 2266 § 1101(3), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
56. See 124 CONG. REc. S17,404, S17,417-S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini), 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(a)(b) (Supp. II 1978). In those cases where a debtor's unsecured liabilities exceed $5,000,000 (exclusive of debts for goods, services, taxes, or
owing to an insider), it may be expected that a "party in interest," including the SEC, may
request the appointment of an examiner. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
57. 124 CONG. REC. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC.
H11,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
58. 124 CONG. REc. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC.
Hl1,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra
note 10, at 233.
59. It is stated in the House Report:
The policy that has been followed generally in the consolidation of the two reorganization
chapters has been flexibility, in place ofthe absolute rules now contained in chapter X, and
determination of the needs of each case on the facts of the case. The current state of
reorganization situations suggests that that same need for flexibility and case-by-case
determination exists in the development of the standard for the appointment of a trustee.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 233.
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except where the court, upon request of an interested party and after notice
and hearing, determines that a disinterested trustee is necessary..6
Section
1104(a) envisions the appointment of a trustee either "for cause"-such
cause including fraud, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement of the debtor's
affairs by current management or some other similar occurrence-or where
the appointment is in the "interests of creditors, any equity security holders,
and other interests of the estate." 61 In either case, however, these standards are to be applied without regard to the amount of assets or liabilities
of the debtor or the number of security holders. 62
Because the disinterested trustee was the investor protection feature of
chapter X most often at issue in the litigation over which reorganization
chapter was applicable, the SEC may now be, as it was then, 63 the moving
force in seeking the public protection afforded by the appointment of a
trustee. 64 Although a "party in interest" must make the request, it is clear
that the SEC may do so. 65 Whether such an application will have the same
effect as the former transfer motion is difficult to project, although it surely
could cause public investors and their representatives to focus on the need
for this protection in a particular case. 66
60. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(a) (Supp. 11 1978). See § 1104(c) for a discussion of replacement
for a deceased trustee or examiner. The inclusion of the language "on request of a party in interest" is designed to preclude the bankruptcy courts from acting sua sponte. 124 CoNG. REC.
S17,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
61. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
62. The exclusion of the size of the debtor or the number of persons owning its securities
reflects one of the holdings of General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956). It
also rejects the presumption of SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613 (1965)
("as a general rule Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for the adjustment of publicly held
debt").
63. "Where a case originated in Chapter XI, the application for transfer to Chapter X under
§ 328 was usually made by the SEC." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 4.22(2), at 470 (14th ed.
1978). In that regard, it had been suggested that the discretionary appointment of a trustee
"will only shift the controversial litigation [over whether a case should be transferred from
chapter XI to chapter X1 to the need for the appointment." Hearingson S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 624 (1977) (statement of SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis,
Jr.).
64. Just as a trustee under former chapter X was required to be disinterested, see text
accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra, so, too, must a trustee appointed pursuant to § 1104(a) be a
"disinterested person." 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(c) (Supp. II 1978). Section 101(13) of the Act
defines "disinterested person" in a similar negative context as it was defined for purposes of the
appointment of a trustee in former chapter X-that is, an individual who can demonstrate an
absence of relationships with the debtor that create or give the appearance of a conflict. 11
U.S.C. app. § 101(13) (Supp. 11 1978). Likewise, an examiner appointed pursuant to § 1104(b)
must be a disinterested person. Id. § 1104(c). See also King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 115 (1979) [hereinafter cited as King].
65. The House noted: "By virtue of proposed 11 U.S.C. § 1109,. .. the Securities and Exchange Commission will be [a party] in interest for the purpose of requesting the appointment'
of a trustee or examiner." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 403. See id. at 234; King,
supra note 64, at 114, 116.
66. Because the main thrust of an SEC transfer motion involved the appointment of a
disinterested trustee, stiff resistance was usually encountered from the debtor, whose manage-
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Circumstances in which a trustee will be appointed "for cause" are not
difficult to imagine. 67 Because of the proposed representation of creditors
and equity security holders by committees that are expected to play an active role in the case, however, it is likely that the specific criteria relating to
the appointment of a trustee "in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate" will evolve through judicial
construction. 68
ment would be replaced. This prompted protracted hearings and, when other parties took
sides, resulted in complicated legal situations, such as that in In re Continental Mortgage Investors, Inc., 578 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978) (entry of an order adjudicating the debtor prior to
hearing on pending transfer motions). The SEC's right to initiate appeals on adverse transfer
motion determinations was a potent force, both in the initial chapter XI filing decision involving
a public company and in the ultimate resolution of the transfer issue, such as by an amended
arrangement, consent to transfer to chapter X, or the like. Without the right to appeal, now,
however, judicial standards for the appointment of a disinterested trustee will have to be determined through appeals initiated by other parties in interest. Because it may participate in
such appeals (see note 24 supra), the SEC may be expected to be an active force with respect to
this issue.
67. Under this standard, there is little question that a trustee would be appointed, for
example, in a case having facts similar to the chapter X case of In re Equity Funding Corp. of
America. "Equity Funding involved fraud on a grand scale," and a court would have "little
difficulty" in concluding that a trustee should be appointed. 124 CONG. REc. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. H1l,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Edwards). See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
A less egregious case that could result in the appointment of a trustee for "cause" would be
one where mismanagement exists and new management has not been brought in. Although the
House Report seems to designate "honest mismanagement" as an insufficient cause for appointment (see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 233), to the extent that "honest mismanagement" equates with "incompetence," 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978), such should
suffice for cause. Of course, the difficulty in permitting management to remain in possession is
that if a cause of action for mismanagement is discovered, public creditors and stockholders are
entitled to redress against the very management that operates the debtor's business and
negotiates the plan. If a debtor has not put its house in order by replacing management before
filing a petition, chapter 11 ought not to be used as a haven for discredited management.
Daylin, Inc., cited as an example of a public company that confirmed a chapter XI arrangement
without a trustee, 124 CONG. REc. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini)
and 124 CONG. IEc. H11,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards), installed
new operating management prior to the filing of its chapter XI petition, and that management
guided the debtor back to financial health. See In re Daylin, Inc., No. BK 75-02958JM (C.D.
Cal., filed Feb. 26, 1975).
However, in Fricke v. Daylin, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 90, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), which involved a
shareholders' derivative suit commenced before bankruptcy, a non-bankruptcy court rejected a
compromise offered by Daylin and the defendants, who were directors, in settlement of charges
of waste, mismanagement, securities law violations, and breach of fiduciary duty. In refusing the
compromise as unfair to Daylin, the court noted that the company "is being asked to relinquish
meritorious causes of action for waste and breach of fiduciary duty. . .without visible consideration passing to the corporation." Id. at 97-98. Proponents of the compromise essentially maintained that "since Daylin is in urgent need of liquid assets," id. at 96, return of certain assets
was justification for the compromise-an argument the court dismissed as raising a "serious
question" with "fiduciaries." Id. at 98.
68. The "alternative standards" for appointment of a trustee reflect the compromise leading
to the Senate amendment. 124 CONG. REC. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.

1979]

BUSINESS REORGANIZATION

If appointed, a trustee is charged with duties similar to those formerly
imposed upon a chapter X trustee. 69 Authority is given, inter alia, to operate the debtor's business; conduct a thorough investigation of the affairs of
the debtor, its financial condition, operation of its business and desirability
of its continuation and any other matter relevant to formulating a plan; file a
report of such investigation, including facts relating to fraud, mismanagement, or causes of action available to the estate, and transmit a copy or
summary of the report to any appointed committees, indenture trustees, and
any other entity 70 designated by the court; and formulate a plan, file a report explaining why no plan will be submitted, or recommend conversion of
the case to bankruptcy. 71 Thus, it appears that, in those cases where a
trustee is appointed, one of the major investor protections envisioned by
Congress when it passed chapter X is retained. 72
By contrast, in a case where no trustee is appointed, the debtor would
continue in possession and operate its business. 73 Because a debtor in possession will not conduct any required investigation or submit a report
thereon, 74 Congress, as a compromise, has provided that under certain cirEdwards). An earlier version of § 1104(a) of the House Bill provided for a trustee "only if' that
protection was "needed" and the costs would not be "disproportionately" higher than the value
afforded. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1104(a) (1977). On the other hand, the Senate
version provided that in the case of a "public company," the court was automatically required to
appoint a "disinterested trustee," and, in a nonpublic case, upon request, the court could order
an election of a trustee or, if one is not elected, appoint a trustee "in the interests of the estate
and security holders." S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702 (1978). The Senate was no doubt
thinking of chapter X: "Investor protection is most critical when the company in which the
public invested is in financial difficulties and is forced to seek relief under the bankruptcy laws."
S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 10. The House version was premised on former chapter
XI: "[T]he public and the creditors will not necessarily be harmed if the debtor is continued in
possession in a reorganization case, as has been demonstrated under current Chapter XI." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 233. The determination of "interests" of creditors, equity
security holders, and other interests in the estate sufficient to require a trustee will be influenced by a balancing of the goals of protecting public investors in a proper reorganization and
facilitating the proceeding toward a successful conclusion. Perhaps such factors as the debtor's
familiarity with the business, the nature of the business reverses, prefiling changes in management, and the intensity of conflicting interests between various classes of creditors and equity
security holders will be considered. The judicial task will be to interpret the Congressional
compromise.
69. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(a) (Supp. II 1978). Cf. Chandler Act, ch. X, §§ 164, 167, 169,
189, 52 Stat. 889, 890, 892 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208(a), -207,
-301(b).
70. The Reform Act defines "entity" to include person or governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 101(14) (Supp. 11 1978). In that regard, it should be noted that " 'person' includes individual,
partnership or corporation." Id. § 101(30).
71. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 1409, supra note 53, at 43.
73. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1107(a) (Supp. 11 1978). Section 156 of former chapter X and chapter X
rule 10-202(a) provided for the discretionary appointment of a trustee where the requisite indebtedness was less than $250,000. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938) (repealed 1979);
SUP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-202(a).
74. 11 U.S.C. app. § l107(a) (Supp. II 1978).
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cumstances an examiner can be appointed to conduct an investigation. 75
The authors presume that the basis for this provision was the same in 1978
as it was when chapter X was passed-that is, "a debtor in possession cannot be expected to investigate itself."" 6
CREDITOR AND EQUITY SECURITY HOLDER COMMITTEES

A second significant form of investor participation, and thus protection, in
reorganization proceedings will
be through committees, either investororganized or court-appointed, 77 representing classes of creditors and equity
security holders. 78 In the past, investor participation through committees
was encouraged, and the committees and their counsel were permitted to
79
receive compensation and expenses from the estate for services rendered.
Moreover, the official chapter XI committee was assigned express statutory
75. Id. § 1104(b). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 234, 402. This would
appear to be similar to those chapter X cases in which a debtor remained in possession and an
examiner was appointed to conduct an investigation and report thereon. Chandler Act, ch. X,
§4 156, 168, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208(b). It is said
that the examiner compromise provision "should adequately represent the needs of public security holders in most cases." 124 CONG. REC. S17,417 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. H11,100 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
76. Testimony of then SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas, Hearings Before House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1937), cited in SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 617 (1965).
77. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978); note 88 infra. Former chapter X provided for committees representing various groups but had no one official committee, while
former chapter XI had one official committee. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

5.35(2), at 702

(14th ed. 1978).
78. Accordingly, it has been said:
In corporate reorganization the frequent necessity for representation of the individual creditor or stockholder by an agent or committee (more often the latter) is
particularly evident ....
In cases often arising, the creditors and stockholders of the
debtor are widely scattered, the securities of the debtor have been sold to the
public generally and large numbers of the security holders may be persons of small
means holding securities in small amounts. . . . A solution for such creditor and
shareholder participation, therefore, is through the medium of representative agents
or committees which will act for a number of persons similarly situated.
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

9.28, at 1726-77 (14th ed. 1978).

79. Because the former chapter XI committee was an official one, it was entitled to reimbursement and compensation for the services of its counsel and other court-approved agents.
Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 339(2), as added by Act of Nov. 28, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-158, 81 Stat.
517 (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R: BANKR. P. 11-29(c). On the other hand, former chapter X
contemplated unofficial committees, freely formed, which had the absolute right to appear in
the proceeding. Section 209 of former chapter X provided that "[a]ny creditor or stockholder
may . . . act in person, by an attorney at law, or by a duly authorized agent or committee."
Chandler Act, ch. X, § 209, 52 Stat. 895 (1938) (repealed 1979). The court regulated the representation, however, by requiring certain information to be disclosed, id. § 211, 52 Stat. 895;
SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-211, and compensation from the estate depended on demonstrable
benefit relating to the plan or the administration of the estate, the risk of which was on the
applicant. Id. § 242(1), 52 Stat. 900; SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-215(c)(1)(B). In Protective
Comm. v. Kirkland, 434 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971) (chapter X

1979]

BUSINESS REORGANIZATION

functions in connection with the arrangement proceeding. 80 Chapter X
committees, on the other hand, had no specific functions and always represented the general interests of the particular creditor or shareholder group
authorizing the committee to represent it. 81 It was because of this fundamental difference in the origin of chapter X committees that the court was
given a measure of control in regulating their activities, such as by refusing

to permit them to "be heard further" where they failed to supply the court
with requisite information concerning the representation.

82

Committees under the Reform Act will be governed by procedures con83
sisting of a "combination of features" from former chapters X and XI.
Section 1109(b) contemplates a broad committee participation with the
committee deemed a party in interest, which, like the SEC, "may raise and
may appear and be heard on any issue" in the case. 84

Together with the

specific functions and rights of a committee, its official standing should develop as a potent force in protecting the rights of public investor classes,
creditor or equity, in a reorganization case. 85 With the bankruptcy judge
now removed from active participation in the case 86 and the preference for
leaving the debtor in possession, a chapter 11 committee will assume a sub-

case involving an active committee), the court said that "[t]he committee is entitled to participate fully in these proceedings, and if its services result in a benefit to the estate, compensation
for those services is authorized." Id. at 807-08.
80. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 339, as added by Act of Nov. 28, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-158, 81
Stat. 517 (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-29(a). These functions included consulting
with the debtor in possession, negotiating the plan, and investigating the debtor. Id.
81. As an official committee, a committee under the former chapter XI acted for the only
group it could represent, unsecured creditors, SuP. CT. R.BANKR. P. 11-27, whereas a former
chapter X committee represented only those individuals who "duly authorized" it to represent
them. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 209, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1979).
82. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 213, 52 Stat. 895 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P.
10-211. This power also included enforcing compliance "with any other applicable law regulating
the activities and personnel of any .. . committee .. .or any other impropriety in connection
with any solicitation," Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-211(b), which covered the proxy requirements
under the Securities Exchange Act. In re First Home Inv. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.
Kan. 1973) (applicable statutory law must be complied with for committee of investors to be
heard in proceeding).
83. H.R. REP.. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 235.
84. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1109(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
85. Public investor participation in a reorganization case through committee representation
of widespread investors would seem essential in a large case because there may be no trustee
and the merits of the plan no longer are required to be examined by the SEC as they were
under former chapter X. As the Supreme Court noted: "Public investors are... generally widely
scattered and are far less likely than trade creditors to be aware of the financial condition and
cause of the collapse of the debtor." SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613-14
(1965).
86. For example, § 341(c) provides that the bankruptcy judge "may not preside at, and may
not attend," the official meetings of creditors and equity security holders. 11 U.S.C. app.
§ 341(c) (Supp. II 1978). But see S. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(b) (1979), suggesting an
amendment to § 341(c) that would require the court to "preside at any election of the trustee."
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stantial responsibility in connection with the case, especially in the development of the terms of a plan of reorganization. 87 Further, all chapter
11 committees are official in that they are appointed either by the court or
the U.S. Trustee. 88 The Act requires that in all cases at least one committee representing unsecured creditors be appointed "as soon as practicable"
after the commencement of the case.8 9
Because chapter 11, like former chapter X, can affect the rights of secured
and unsecured creditors, as well as stockholders, provision is made for other
committees to represent various investor groups. Additional committees,
however, are not formed automatically. On the request of a "party in interest," the court may, but need not, order the "appointment of additional
committees of creditors or of equity security holders." 90 The statutory
condition for creating an additional committee is that the court find the committee
"necessary to assure adequate representation" of creditors or stockholders. 9 1
Hence, a large publicly held debtor with senior unsecured creditors, subordinated
debenture holders, and shareholders may very well require the creation of three
committees. 92 When that occurs, each additional committee has "status equal to
87. This is emphasized by the fact that a plan participation for a particular investor group
now is negotiated with the debtor, or plan proponent, and the fair and equitable standard of
former chapter X, a public investor protection of that chapter, no longer is controlling. See text
accompanying notes 210-39 infra.
88. 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 1102(a), 151102 (Supp. II 1978). The U.S. Trustee, an experimental
administrative aspect of the Reform Act, makes the appointments in certain pilot districts (e.g.,
the Southern District of New York and the Central District of California), while the court acts
in all other districts. Appointment, rather than election, is designed "to insure that the committees are fairly representative and not solely controlled by attorneys seeking the counsel position." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 236. This approach could make for more effective committee representation.
89. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1101(a) (Supp. II 1978). This mirrors former chapter XI. The idea is to
form the committee right away, and, because unsecured creditors are usually the largest body of
claimants "most in need of representation," the mandatory committee consists of unsecured
creditors. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 235. In former chapter XI, committees
usually were formed at the first meeting of creditors, which was required to be held between
20-40 days after filing of the petition, SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-25(a)(1), although committee
creation was not mandatory. Id. at R. 11-27(a). Former chapter X had no provision regarding
committee formation, other than sections regulating the activities of committees when they
sought to appear and be heard in the case. See notes 77 & 79 supra.
90. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). Thus, following the appointment approach,
there may even be additional committees of secured creditors, such as first mortgage bondholders, and stockholders. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 236.
91. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102 (a) (2) (Supp. II 1978).
92. In negotiating a plan, debentures' claims might conflict with trade debt, and equity
interests are of a different legal position in any event. Should the debtor propose to affect all
these classes in a plan, it would seem that separate committees should be appointed to assure
"adequate representation" of the public debentures and shareholders in the plan process. In
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 401, it was said that this provision "will be relied upon
in cases in which the debtor proposes to affect several classes of debt or equity holders under
the plan, and in which they need representation." To this extent, then, the additional committee may become a substitute for the mandatory appointment of a trustee in the larger chapter X
cases, as a public investor protection feature of the Act, when no trustee is appointed.
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that of the unsecured creditors' committee." 93 Because, as noted previously, the
SEC has the right to "raise .. , appear and be heard on any issue" in the case, like
parties in interest designated in section 1109(b), the Commission should be able to
request the appointment of additional committees of public creditors and equity
security holders in an appropriate case. 94 Such a step may be necessary to make
the provision for additional committees an effective investor protection feature. 95
Through precatory language, the Act provides that the members of the
mandatory unsecured creditors' committee shall "ordinarily" be the holders
of the "seven largest" unsecured claims against the debtor "willing to
serve.'96 Thus, such a committee in a large public debtor could consist
largely of institutional creditor representatives. 97 On the other hand, recognizing the situation that existed in some chapter XI cases-where a committee was formed before the petition was filed 9S-the court may continue

93. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10. at 235.
94. Under former chapter X the SEC supported the right of a properly formed and qualified
committee to be heard, and it even opposed committee attempts at special intervention on the
ground that it was unnecessary and unauthorized. See In re Flour Mills of America, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 559 (W.D. Mo. 1939) (SEC motion to vacate orders permitting intervention of security
holders committee, sustained). Moreover, because Congress intended to broaden the rights of
parties specified in § 206 of former chapter X to participate in corporate reorganization proceedings, In re Keystone Holding Co., 117 F.2d 1003, 1005 (3d Cir. 1941) (creditor), there was no
need for such parties to seek intervention. In re South State St. Bldg. Corp., 140 F.2d 363, 366
(7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1943) (stockholder); Rudnick v. Coney Island
Boardwalk Corp., 181 F.2d 775, 776 (2d Cir. 1950) (creditor).
95. Early determination of the need for "adequate representation" of investors through additional committees will facilitate the development of the plan because committees "will be the
primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the plan of reorganization." H.R. REP. No.
95-595, supra note 10, at 401. In In re Rosenbaum Grain Co., 13 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. I11.1935),
a reorganization under former § 77B, the debtor petitioned to have the court appoint a creditors' committee and a stockholders' committee and, on its own, designate the chairman of
each committee. In granting the petition, the court noted:
In a great majority of the cases presented to the court the creditors of the corporation are widely scattered, bonds having been sold to the public generally and very
frequently large numbers of persons of small means hold bonds in quite small
amounts. These creditors have great difficulty in protecting their interests, and the
holder of a thousand dollar bond cannot afford to employ counsel to represent him
in the proceedings.
Id. at 600.
96. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978). This provision prevents "the appointment of
creditors who are unwilling to serve on a creditors committee." 124 CONG. REc. S17,419 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REc. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
97. For example, the official creditors' committee in the chapter XI proceedings of In re
Daylin, Inc., No. BK75-02958JM (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 26, 1975), consisted of 11 members
selected by the unsecured creditors and confirmed by the court. Seven of the members, including the chairman, were institutional creditors. Prospectus, In re Daylin, Inc., Aug. 19, 1976, at
16. The statutory direction, however, says "ordinarily," and this should provide the requisite
flexibility. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(b)(a) (Supp. II 1978).
98. These cases usually involved a "pre-packaged" chapter XI proceeding for a quick run
through the bankruptcy court to effect a majority acceptance of a presolicited plan. For exam-
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a pre-petition committee where it determines that the membership was
"fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be
represented."' 99 When that occurs, the committee becomes the mandatory
committee contemplated by the Act. 100 The membership of additional
committees representing creditors and shareholders follows the same pattern
as the appointed mandatory committee's composition. 101 Moreover, the
court retains overall flexibility to insure that a committee is "representative
of the different kinds of claims or interests to be represented." 102 It may
change the "membership or the size of a committee" where a need to do so
develops. 103 However, a party in interest must request the change, which
can only be done "after notice and a hearing." 104
Committees formed under the new chapter 11 also function with official
standing in the case. 105 A committee can select and, "with the court's ap-

ple, in In re Colwell Mortgage Trust, No. BK 78-01454 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 1979), the debtor
"negotiated a recapitalization plan with its institutional creditors, filed a proxy statement
with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and solicited consents of its creditors and shareholders prior to filing its chapter XI petition. Thereafter, Colwell confirmed its plan of arrangement
41 days after filing its Chapter XI petition." 124 CONG. REc. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Edwards).
99. 11 U.S.C, app. § 1102(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
100. It should be noted that the committee membership may differ in number and representation. A newly appointed creditors' committee ordinarily consists of seven members holding
the largest claims "of the kinds represented" on the committee, whereas a continued committee
may vary in number and consist of members who are "representative of the different kinds of
claims to be represented." Id.
101. Id. Additional committees of creditors shall ordinarily consist of the seven largest holders of claims willing to serve, and "similar treatment" is required for shareholder committees.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 401.
102. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(c) (Supp. II 1978). This power would protect public investors
represented by a committee from potential overreaching and conflicts of interest of the type that
existed in Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941). There, the underwriter
of a bond issue, which was heavily interested in the equity, and an indenture trustee, which
formed the committee, dominated the five-member committee. The Supreme Court noted that
"[pirotective committees... are fiduciaries." Id. at 268.
103. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1102(c) (Supp. II 1978). An example in which circumstances may
require a change would be when a bank, which is a member of the creditors' committee, is both
a lender and an indenture trustee. Thus, a conflict would exist in connection with negotiating
the plan.
104. Id. This permits parties in interest to "police" the representation and effectiveness of a
particular committee, even though it was initially appointed by the court or U.S. Trustee. It
also affords "latitude in appointing a committee that is manageable and representative in light of
the circumstances of the case." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 402. Frequently, the
seven largest unsecured creditors will be institutional claimants, who might not be representative of the public unsecured claims represented by the committee. This provision would authorize the court to reshape the committee. A request by the SEC, for example, could raise
that issue for court scrutiny.
105. This approach follows former chapter XI, because chapter X committees were not official
in any sense, although they acted in a fiduciary capacity. See Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
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proval," authorize the employment of "attorneys, accountants, or other
agents, to represent or perform services" for it. 106 This provision gives a
committee the ability to function effectively in representing a class in the
proceeding, while it retains a measure of court control over the expenses it
will incur. 107
The new Act sets forth certain statutory functions which a committee, by
virtue of its official status, is expected to discharge upon appointment.' 0 8
The "most important functions" of a committee concern the administration of

the estate, investigation of the debtor, and the preparation of a plan. 10 9
With a debtor left in possession, these functions take on significance where
public investor classes are concerned. Decisions in the administration of an
estate may have a crucial bearing on a plan of reorganization, and the right
of consultation with the debtor's management (or trustee, if one is appointed) will be important. 110

Investigation of the debtor, in an appropriate case, could be of substantial
importance in aiding a committee to determine whether an independent
trustee is needed, "I as one can be appointed "[a]t any time after the commencement of the case," but before confirmation, 112 and in negotiating the

terms of a plan. Moreover, in assessing a plan proponent's disclosure statement, a prior inquiry into the debtor's affairs may be necessary and, in some

106. 11 U.s.c. app. § 1103(a) (Supp. 11 1978). The committee meets at "scheduled" meetings
where a majority of its members must be present. Id.
107. Under former chapter XI, an attorney retained by the committee had to be authorized
by the court. The reason was stated by the Advisory Committee's note to chapter XI rule 11-22:
"Such attorney ... will be compensated from the estate; accordingly, there should be some
supervision by the court over the original appointment." Chapter X committees received compensation only upon a showing of benefit to the estate. SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-215(c)(1)(B).
108. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1103(c) (Supp. II 1978). These functions apply to "a committee appointed under section 1102," and thus apply to the mandatory, as well as any additional committee. Id.
109. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 402. In addition, the Act indicates that a
committee may request the appointment of a trustee or examiner and perform other services "in
the interest of those represented." 11 U.S.C. app. § 1103(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
110. Both former chapters X and XI contemplated this right. Chapter XI provided for it in
SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11- 2 9(a). Chapter X recognized a right to compensation for services
"beneficial in the administration of the estate." Chandler Act, ch. X, § 242(1), 52 Stat. 900
(1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-215(c)(1)(B) (1975). Thus, for example, compensable services have included those rendered in "actively supporting proposals" of a trustee,
In re National Radiator Co., 29 F. Supp. 804, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1939), or in connection with the
"removal of ...

[an] . . . additional trustee" and in "opposition to the investment by the trust-

ees of liquid funds of the debtor." In re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp., 65 F. Supp. 116, 119
(E.D.N.Y. 1946). See also In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 577 F.2d 1296, 1301, 1303 (5th Cir.
1978), where the court of appeals, among other things, raised a fee award to a stockholders'
committee whose services included defeating unfair plans, questioning claims of certain parties,
and obtaining removal of a trustee.
111. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1103(c)(4) (Supp. 11 1978). "The committee ... may request the appointment of a trustee .... " H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 402.
112. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
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cases, deemed essential. The new Act adopts the broad chapter X provision
with respect to the scope of a committee investigation: "A committee...
may ... investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability
of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the
case or to the formulation of a plan."113
The other major role of a committee will be to "participate in the formulation of a plan" and advise those it represents of its recommendations as well
as "collect and file" acceptances with the court. 114 In fact, a committee, as
in former chapter X, may file a plan of reorganization with the court should
it be unable to successfully negotiate a proper participation for those it represents. 115 Especially in view of the confirmation requirements for a
plan, 116 a committee's vigilance in securing a fair participation in the reorganized company will be vital in preserving the rights of widely scattered
public investors.
INVESTIGATION AND PLAN FORMULATION

Reorganization, as distinguished from liquidation, contemplates the continued existence of a business as a going concern. Thus, the goal of the
proceeding is the development of a plan of reorganization that will be accepted by affected creditors and stockholders. This process involves, among
other things, an investigation of the debtor's past and a projection of its
future. Also, these steps provide additional means of investor protection.
Investigation
One of the most important factors from the point of view of investor protection found in chapter X was the provision requiring the independent trustee
to conduct an investigation. 1 17 The trustee was required: (1) to investi-

113. Id. § 1103(c)(2). This is comparable to the trustee's investigation under § 167(1) of former
chapter X and chapter X rule 10-208(a)(4), and is the same type of investigation required of a
chapter 11 trustee, or examiner, when appointed. Id. §§ 1106(a)(3), 1106(b). Appendix I to the
House Report indicates a rule may set "[ghuidelines for a chapter 11 creditors' committee's
investigation of the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 302.
114. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1103(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1978). These functions follow the chapter XI approach outlined in § 339(1) and chapter XI rule 11-29(a) concerning the official committee's
functions in that proceeding.
115. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1121(c) (Supp. I 1978). The section, however, limits the filing of a
committee plan to situations where a trustee is appointed or the debtor loses its 120- or 180-day
plan exclusivity. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
116. See text accompanying notes 210-40 infra.
117. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167, 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979); SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208.
See Committee for Holders v. Kent, 143 F.2d 684, 686-87 (4th Cir. 1944). In Kent, the appellate court reversed the district court's order confirming the trustee's report and denying the
committee's request for a more complete investigation or for the appointment of an examiner.
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gate, among other things, the conduct and financial affairs of the debtor, the
operation of its business and whether it should be continued, and other matters relevant to the formulation of a plan;l11 (2) to report to the court the
facts uncovered pertaining to fraud, mismanagement, and causes of action
available to the estate; 119 and (3) to transmit a report of the investigation, or
summary thereof, to creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the SEC,
and others designated by the court.12 0 The transmission of this information
to interested parties provided them with essential facts to enable them to
12 1
respond intelligently to the trustee's request for plan suggestions.
In order to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, it had to "necessarily [be] extensive and searching" and public. 122 In any event, "any information obtained by the trustee in reorganization as a result of the investigation which the statute require[d] that he make" was to be made available
to all parties in interest. 123

The importance of the investigation recently was reaffirmed in In re Farrington Mfg. Co., 540
F.2d 653, 659 n.ll (4th Cir. 1975).
118. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167(1), 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR.
4
P. 10-208(a)( ).
119. Id. § 167(3); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208(a)(5). See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642, 657 (1947) (chapter X trustee given investigative powers to discover wrongdoing and also
expected to pursue causes of action available to the estate, and "[t]hese provisions were 'of
paramount importance in the revision of Section 77B' "). For an example of a case where the
facts uncovered in an investigation not only led to recoveries for the estate but also to a significant reduction in claims, see In re Farrington Mfg. Co., 540 F.2d 653, 658-59 (4th Cir. 1975).
120. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167(5), 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR.
P. 10-208(a)( 7).
121. Although "[i]t was [the trustee's] duty to prepare the reorganization plan," Williams v.
Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 657 (1947), the trustee was also required to seek suggestions from
creditors and stockholders prior to formulating a plan. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167(6), 52 Stat.
890 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208(a)(8). See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY
7.25, at 1271-72, $ 7.26, at 1272-74 (14th ed. 1978).
122. United States v. Williams, 424 F.2d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, 431
F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1048 (1972) (record failed to
establish misuse of office by trustee); In re South State St. Bldg. Corp., 105 F.2d 680, 682 (7th
Cir. 1939) (investigation into debtor's affairs appropriate).
123. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972). In the chapter X
proceeding out of which that case arose, the district judge entered an order granting counsel in
a class action brought on behalf of holders of publicly held debentures access to the debtor's
records. In re Webb & Knapp, Inc., No. 65-B-365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1974). See In re Farrington Mfg. Co., 540 F.2d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 1975), and the related case of F.O.F. Proprietary
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., No. 73 Civ. 3262 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1975) (trustee's
sharing of fruits of investigation with party to reorganization proceeding does not make lawsuit
based on such information a collusive action); In re THC Financial Corp., No. BK 76-0493, (D.
Hawaii, filed Dec. 8, 1976) (the chapter X trustee's investigation and work product were made
available to plantiffs' counsel in collateral class action suits pursuant to an agreement with the
trustee providing for costs to the estate from any recovery).
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By contrast, there was no similar requirement for an extensive investigation and report in former chapter XI. That chapter did, however, provide for
an examination, at the first meeting of the creditors, into "any matter relevant to the proceeding." 124 Furthermore, the official creditors' committee 1 2 5 could inquire into how the debtor's affairs had been conducted and
was to report on the progress of the proceeding. 126 In that context, as with
a chapter X investigation, the committee could employ attorneys, account127
ants, or others to assist it in carrying out the investigative function.
Along with adopting the more flexible case-by-case approach to the appointment of a trustee, Congress also appears to have chosen a case-by-case
determination of the nature and extent of the investigation that should be
conducted. This conclusion is suggested by the legislative history of the Act
dealing with the compromise reached regarding trustee appointment or
debtor-in-possession retention and, in many of the latter-type cases, the appointment, upon request, of an examiner. It could be that the investigation
will fall somewhere between the extensive investigation required by former
chapter X and the more limited examination that was generally conducted in
128
chapter XI cases.

124. Chandler Act, ch. XI § 336(3), 52 Stat. 908 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR.
P. 11-26 (1974). See SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-25(a)(2).
125. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 338, 52 Stat. 909 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P.
11-27(b).
126. Id. § 339(1); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-29(a). See SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 205, 205(a),
(d), (e).
127. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 339(2), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended by 81 Stat. 517 (1967),
(repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-29(b). In one chapter XI case, such an investigation
resulted in certain recoveries to the estate from former management. In re Stratton Group, Ltd.
No. 73-B-918 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 1973).
128. One of the matters that could be dealt with by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may
include fixing "[gluidelines regulating an examiner's or trustee's investigation of the debtor in a
case under chapter 11." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 302. While it is to be expected that in cases where a trustee is appointed, he or she will continue to file lawsuits and
prosecute causes of action available to the estate, there may be a question as to what happens to
such causes of action in debtor-in-possession cases. Because the filing of such actions is not
listed as one of the duties to be performed by an examiner, see 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(b) (Supp.
II 1978), and because it generally can be presumed that a debtor-in-possession may not wish to
pursue such actions against its officers and directors, one may expect that in an appropriate case
the court will order the examiner to perform this additional duty. (S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 171 (1979), if passed, however, would expressly permit a court to order an examiner to perform additional duties to those prescribed in the Act.) That would be similar to the approach
that was contemplated for debtor-in-possession cases by § 216(13) of former chapter X: "provisions [should be made] as to such claims not settled or adjusted in the plan, for their retention
and enforcement ...if the debtor has been continued in possession, by an examiner appointed
for that purpose." Chandler Act, ch. X, § 213(13), 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1979).
The question does arise, however, whether, in those cases in which the application of a party
in interest for such authority to be given the examiner is denied, such a party could bring an
action derivatively on behalf of the corporate debtor. Compare rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires that in a stockholder derivative action the plaintiff-stockholder
must allege what efforts were made "to obtain the action [plaintiff] desires from the directors or

1979]

BUSINESS REORGANIZATION

Thus, while it is true that a trustee or an examiner is to conduct an investigation covering areas similar to those set forth in section 167(1) of former
chapter X, 129 based on the legislative history of chapter 11, it is to be expected that arguments will be made that the investigation should not be so
extensive as to delay the proceeding, or at least that the reorganization
should proceed even before a report of investigation is made public. 130 In
that regard, section 1104(b) specifically provides that the examiner appointed
in a nontrustee case is "to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as [the
court finds] is appropriate." 131 Therefore, the authors believe that interested
parties, including the SEC, can continue to raise with the court issues related to what type of an investigation is appropriate and to participate in
such investigations. 132 However, the scope and extent of that investigation
will be prescribed by the needs of the case and will not necessarily be automatic.
Plan Formulation
Another important factor meriting analysis is the relationship of the investigation process to plan formulation. As noted above, former chapter X
required that the trustee transmit to creditors, stockholders, and other interested parties a report or summary of investigation. 133 One of the purposes of that report was to provide information to those who could submit
plan suggestions in response to the trustee's request. On the other hand,
under former chapter XI, the debtor submitted an arrangement which, in
most cases, had been negotiated with the official creditors' committee. That
comparable authority .. .and the reasons for [the plaintiffs] failure to obtain the action." FED.
R.Csv. P. 23.1.
129. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(3) (Supp. I11978).
130. Cf., e.g., statements of Senator DeConcini and Representative Edwards: "It will not be
necessary for the court to consider the report of the examiner prior to approval of a disclosure
statement. The investigation of the examiner is to proceed on an independent basis from the
procedure of the reorganization under chapter 11." 124 CONG. REC. S17,418, S17,420 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONC. REc. H11,101, HI1,103 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
131. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1104(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
132. The SEC, for example, supported a committee of preferred stockholders that petitioned
a reorganization court to order "a more complete investigation and report under section 167 [of
former chapter X] than had been made." Committee for Holders v. Kent, 143 F.2d 684, 685-87
(4th Cir. 1943). Furthermore, the Commission's staff often played an active and important role
in connection with the trustee's investigation. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Financial Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 786, 787-88 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
961 (1969) (in chapter X proceeding in which SEC was authorized to participate in contemplated
investigation of debtor and its officers, president of debtor corporation not entitled to protective
order restraining attempts to depose him or examine corporation's affairs); Committee for Holders v. Kent, 143 F.2d at 686; In re Federal Coal Co., (S.D.W. Va. No. 96-270), reported in 38
S.E.C. ANN. REP. 118-19 (1973). Cf. SEC v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 55 (5th Cir. 1968)
(district court order denying SEC, in chapter X proceeding, right to propound questions and
offer evidence, held to be outside authority of that court).
133. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167(5), 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979).
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committee, without court supervision, solicited acceptance or otherwise advised the creditors whether it recommended acceptance. 134
Under subsections (a) and (c) of section 1121 of the new Act, the debtor
can file a plan at any time. Moreover, when the debtor is continued in
possession, it retains the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days after the
order for relief has been entered, 3 5 or for such other period as the court
may order.' 3 6 Because the examiner's investigation is to proceed independently from the other reorganization functions,' 3 7 in a case where the exclusive period has expired, it may be difficult, absent information about the
debtor's affairs, for a party in interest to propose a plan.
In those cases where the debtor does not have the exclusive right to file a
plan, because, for example, a trustee has been appointed, 138 it also is unclear whether interested parties will have the benefit of information obtained
during the investigation in order to file plan proposals. 139 The legislative
history does not suggest that the trustee's investigative report, which should
be made "as soon as practicable," 140 need be filed or transmitted prior to
the plan formulation. While it could be argued that without such facts it
would be difficult to propose a plan, the reasons noted above also would
suggest that the transmission of a report would not necessarily have to precede the filing of plan proposals. 141
DISCLOSURE AND SCRUTINY OF PLAN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS

Background Perspective
As part of the overall court supervision of the reorganization under former
chapter X, the filing of the plan was a most significant stage in the proceeding. Former chapter X provided for interested parties to submit suggestions
for a plan to the trustee, who filed a proposed plan. 142 An evidentiary
hearing on that plan then was held. 143 Other parties could submit a plan or
propose amendments to the trustee's plan, and these were heard concur-

134. Chandler Act, ch. XI, §§ 339(1)(b)-(c), as added by Act of Nov. 28, 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-158, 81 Stat. 517; SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-29(a).
135. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1121(b) (Supp. II 1978).
136. Section 1121(d) permits the court, "[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice
and a hearing," to reduce or increase that period "for cause." Id. § 1121(d).
137. See 124 CONG. RFC. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124
CONG. REC. Hl1,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
138. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1121(c) (Supp. II 1978).
139. It should be noted that, under circumstances described in § 1121(c), interested parties
"may file a plan" rather than submit suggestions to the trustee. Cf. Chandler Act, ch. X,
§ 167(6), 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 10-208(a), 10-310(a).
140. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(a)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. 11 1978).
141. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text infra, concerning situations where the transmission of information gathered during an investigation may be a requisite to "adequate information" for purposes of the disclosure statement required by § 1125.
142. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 167(6), 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979).
143. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 169, 52 Stat. 890 (1938) (repealed 1979).
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rently with the trustee's plan. 144 At the plan hearing, evidence was introduced with respect to the future earning power as well as all other factors
bearing on the debtor's going-concern value. 145 That valuation determined
whether the debtor was solvent-that is, whether value of the estate exceeded claims against the debtor-so that stockholders could participate in
the reorganized company, and whether and on what basis the various classes
were entitled to participate in the reorganization. 146 A plan also had to be
feasible, which meant that the reorganized company, among other things,
had to have a sound capital structure, adequate working capital, and sufficient anticipated earnings to service obligations incurred under the plan. 147
After the hearing and before approval, a plan, if found by the court to be
"worthy of consideration," was required to be submitted to the SEC for an
advisory report if the debtor's liabilities exceeded $3,000,000.148 No order
approving a plan could be entered until at least one of the following events
occurred: (1) receipt of the SEC's report, (2) notification that no report
would be filed, or (3) expiration of the time for filing the report. 149 An
order approving a plan was predicated on a finding by the court that the
plan was fair, equitable, and feasible. 150
Acceptances could not be solicited 151 until the approval order had been
entered and the required materials were transmitted to creditors and stockholders affected by the plan. 152 The package of solicitation materials had
to include the approved plan, a court-approved summary, the court order

144. Id.
145. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941) (valuation is an
estimate, not a certainty, but the "estimate must be based on an informed judgment" taking
into account all relevant facts). See Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 442 (1968).
146. Former chapter X required that a plan be fair and equitable. Chandler Act, ch. X
§§ 174, 221(2), 52 Stat. 891, 897 (1938) (repealed 1979). "Fair and equitable" were terms of art
and incorporated the absolute priority rule. It meant that creditors were entitled to be paid in
full before junior interests could participate under the plan. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-22 (1939) (conditions under which stockholders may participate in
a plan of reorganization). See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965);
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 524 (1941).
147. In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 416 F. Supp. 132, 142 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (chapter X reorganization plan must satisfy absolute priority rule in order to meet statutory requirement that it be fair and equitable); In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa.
1943) (court's discretion to approve reorganization plan is not absolute).
148. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 172, 52 Stat. 891 (1938) (repealed 1979); SuP. CT. R. BANKR. P.
10-303(b).
149. Id. §§ 173, 174 and R. 10-303(c).
150. See notes 209-14 and accompanying text infra.
151. Chandler Act, ch. X, § 176, 52 Stat. 891 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P.
10-303(0, 10-304, 10-211(b). Those provisions suggested, however, that a reorganization court
could consent to solicitation for a plan in advance of the approved order, but this was not the
practice.
152. Id. § 175 and R. 10-303(c).
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approving the plan, any court opinion or summary related to the approved
153
plan, and the SEC's advisory report or summary thereof.
By contrast, under former chapter XI there was little or no court supervision of the procedures related to the solicitation of acceptances for an arrangement. 154 Also, there was no requirement that an arrangement be fair
and equitable. 155 Unlike a chapter X plan, an arrangement was confirmed
if "it [was] for the best interests of creditors and [was] feasible." 156 Further,
a debtor could solicit acceptances prior to filing its chapter XI petition 157
and thus present the court with a prepackaged proceeding that could be
completed in an extremely short period of time.
Finally, another important distinction is that in former chapter XI there
was no judicial review of the terms of the arrangement proposed by the
debtor prior to solicitation of acceptances. 158 Nor did the court review the

153. Id. Because of the court supervision of that solicitation, it was exempt from the SEC's
proxy rules in those cases where these rules otherwise would have applied, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2(e) (1978).
It should also be remembered that prior to the solicitation, the trustee had reported on his or
her investigation to creditors and stockholders. Thus, those persons who were to vote on the
plan had been provided with additional information that may have been relevant to their acceptance or rejection of the plan. See text accompanying notes 117-32 supra.
154. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 694, 605-07 (1965); SEC v. United
States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1940).
155. Although the absolute priority rule never applied to compositions, Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 119-20 n.14 (1939), the phrase "fair and equitable" appeared
in the original § 366 of chapter XI. It was deleted in 1952. S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1952), reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960, 1981-82.
156. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 366(2), (3), 52 Stat. 911 (1938) (repealed 1979); SuP. CT. R.
BANKR. P. 11-38(3), which incorporated Official Form 11-F18. In this context, the creditors' "best interests" meant that they would get more under the arrangement than if the debtor
were liquidated, and the latter was interpreted to mean that the debtor would be able to make
the payments required by the arrangement. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.17, at 281-82, and
9.18, at 287-89 (14th ed. 1978).
157. Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 336(4), 52 Stat. 909 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR.
P. II-37(a). In that regard, it should be noted that convertible debentures are "equity securities" under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1976), which, if held by
more than 500 persons, must be registered under that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1976). Thus, a
pre-chapter XI solicitation of such publicly held convertible debentures had to comply with the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), and the Commission's proxy rules thereunder.
For a case in which pre-chapter XI solicitations were made in compliance with the proxy
provisions and a prepackaged arrangement was filed, see In re Continental Inv. Corp., 586 F.2d
241, 244 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub norn Wallace v. SEC, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). In that
pre-chapter XI solicitation, Continental Investment sought acceptances from at least 95% of its
debenture holders. When it received only about 82%, a chapter XI petition was filed in order to
bind all the debenture holders, which section 362(1) of former chapter XI permitted. Chandler
Act, ch. XI, § 362(1), 52 Stat. 910 (1938) (repealed 1979).
158. Only the debtor could propose an arrangement. See Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 323, 52
Stat. 907 (1938) (repealed 1979); Sup. CT. R. BANKR. P. 11-36(a).
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materials proposed to be used in connection with soliciting creditors' accept59
ances. 1

Disclosure Premise of the Act
In consolidating the former reorganization chapters in the Act, Congress
determined that, as under the federal securities laws, the parties in interest
should be given "adequate information"' 160 to enable them to make their
own informed judgments as to whether they should accept or reject a
plan. 161 The standard to be applied to determine disclosure adequacy is a

159. There was no exemption, however, from the Commission's proxy rules for a solicitation
of acceptances for a chapter XI arrangement from convertible debenture holders (see note 157
supra), as there was for a solicitation of acceptances for a chapter X reorganization plan (see note
153 supra). The SEC's view that the solicitation of acceptances from convertible debenture
holders during the chapter XI proceeding had to comply with the Commission's proxy rules was
sustained in Esgro, Inc., (C.D., Cal., No. 73-02510), reported in 41 SEC ANN. REP. 159 (1976);
42 SEC ANN. REP. 162 (1977).
Additionally, from time to time, the SEC had found it necessary to intervene specially in
chapter XI proceedings to enforce the federal securities laws. See SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613 (1965). In that case, the Commission had alleged, among other
things, that the debtor's soliciting material had omitted certain material facts. In that regard,
the 10th circuit court of appeals held that while securities issued pursuant to an arrangement
were exempt from registration under the Chandler Act, ch. XI, § 393a(2), 52 Stat. 914 (1938)
(repealed 1979), they were not exempt from the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(c), and thus, adequate disclosure had to be made so as to enable creditors (investors) to make informed judgments. In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 52-53 (10th
Cir. 1963). In reversing the denial of the Commission's motion to transfer that case from chapter XI to chapter X, the Supreme Court specifically agreed with that holding. In re American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 615-16 (1965). For chapter XI cases in which the SEC
intervened to call the court's attention to questions arising under the federal securities laws,
see, e.g., Superior Mortgage Co. (C.D. Cal. No. 74-9406) reported in 41 SEC ANN. REP. 161
(1976); Puts and Calls, Inc. (C.D. Cal. No. 73-03706), reported in 41 SEC ANN. REP. 161-62
(1976); Synergistics, Inc. (D. Mass. No. 70-1251) reported in 38 SEC ANN. REP. 126 (1973).
160. While the adequacy of the disclosure is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, frequently plan "solicitation involves an offering of securities in exchange for claims or interests."
S. REp. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 121. Although such offerings are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act, 11 U.S.C. app. § 1145(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978), as a
substitute the Act requires that those persons to whom the offer is made receive a disclosure
statement containing "adequate information." Id. § 1125(b).
161. The premise underlying chapter 11 is disclosure, which "is the same as the premise of
the securities laws." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 224, 226. In that regard, it
should be remembered that on a number of occasions in cases involving questions arising under
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1976), or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1976), the Supreme Court has stated that in enacting those laws,
Congress sought (a) to insure the public dissemination of information in order to provide accurate and complete information upon which investors would be able to make informed investment decisions and (b) "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Accord, Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (a
purpose of the Securities Act is "to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
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flexible one, taking into account the facts of a particular case, 162 but without regard to whether or not the information provided would otherwise
comply, for example, with the registration provisions of the Securities Act or
with the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules
thereunder.' 63 Under the new Act there also will be no approval hearing
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce"); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene
Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941). See Preamble, Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (the full
title of which is "An Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof").
162. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 226. See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note
55, at 121.
163. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(d) (Supp. II 1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at
227-28. In the past the SEC also has been willing to grant issuers of securities relief from strict
compliance with those provisions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Regulation A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.251 to 230.264 (1978), which provides an exemption from full-scale registration
under certain conditions for offerings of securities not in excess of $1,500,000 (see Securities Act
Release No. 5977 (Sept. 11, 1978), 15 SEC Docket 1054), and simplified registration on Form
S-18 for initial offerings of up to $5,000,000 by certain issuers having less than $1,000,000 in
assets and fewer than 500 stockholders (and thus not at the time of filing subject to the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act) (see Securities Act Release No. 6049 (Apr. 3,
1979), 17 SEC Docket 153). Furthermore, in "Application of the reporting provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Issuers Which Have Ceased or Severely Curtailed Their
Operations," Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9660 (June 30, 1972), the Commission also announced its willingness to modify, for example, filing requirements for
an issuer that is the subject of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act when it is assured that
the best available information will be provided to public investors, id. at 2. In t]hat-regard, the
Commission noted that it "generally would accept reports prepared under the supervision of
...[a court-appointed official, such as a chapter X trustee] which differ in form or content from
reports required to be filed under the [Securities] Exchange Act." Id. It further pointed out
that rule 12b-21 under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-21 (1978), provides for
an exemption from filing the type of information ordinarily required in reports, for example, "if
... [such] information is . . . not reasonably available to the issuer because it would be unreasonably expensive or would take an unreasonable effort to obtain." Id.
The legislative history of the Act, however, recognizes that a disclosure statement complying
with the SEC's proxy rules may be appropriate in certain cases, which is to be determined "on
a case-by-case basis." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228. Even in those cases in
which complete registration- or proxy-type disclosure statements are not required, it would
appear that Congress expects those persons involved in the preparation of such statements to
adhere to a high standard of care: "The change [from chapter XI is, in large part, attributable to
the pervasive effect of the Federal securities laws" and the fact that the Commission has "sensitiz[ed] both management and members of the bar to the need for full disclosure." 124 CoNG.
REc. S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini; id. at Hll,101 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)).
The discussion in this section of the Article focuses on the court-approved disclosure statement used in connection with plan solicitations. Situations, however, could arise during the
course of a reorganization proceeding where some form of solicitation is contemplated that
would not be covered by § 1125 and thus would not be exempt from the proxy provisions.
Thus, compliance with those provisions may be necessary where a committee wishes to poll
members of a class to obtain a sense as to what position should be taken, as, for example, on a
proposed sale of assets or some other action proposed to be taken outside of the plan but which
could have an effect on the plan solicitation. See In re First Home Inv. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 597
(D. Kan. 1973) (solicitation of vote from investors on whether dismissal of chapter X petition
was favored and dissemination of material by committee in an effort to obtain contributions from
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for a plan, as in former chapter X. Rather, "the major procedural hearing in
a reorganization case" is expected to be the one on the disclosure state64
ment. 1
The shift to the concept of disclosure of "adequate information" is said to
be "a [reasonable] compromise between the strict requirements of the securities laws and the near-absolute freedom of the [former] bankruptcy
laws."' 1 65 Further, it takes into account the interests of parties who are de-

sirous of concluding the reorganization successfully and also the public interest "inpreventing securities fraud. 166 The question whether a disclosure
statement contains "adequate information" is to be determined by the court
"after notice and a hearing."' 167 At that hearing, the SEC or any other
regulatory agency or official who is responsible for enforcing securities laws
has "an absolute right to appear and be heard" on whether a proposed
statement adequately discloses the relevant facts necessary for the parties in
interest to make informed decisions. 168 Although no regulatory authority,

investors involved soliciting proxies and would be enjoined where there had been no compliance with SEC's proxy rules and false and misleading information of material facts had been
disseminated). Cf. Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, reported in [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (where purpose of a committee was to oust management, its
mailings of newspaper articles were found to be "communications ... under circumstances
reasonably calculated to result in the [future] procurement, withholding or revocation' of proxies" against management's interests, id. at 94,644-65 and n.2).
164. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 227, 229. The disclosure hearing, thus, is a
substitute for the evidentiary hearing held on the plan in former chapter X.
Because § 1125(b) only requires a court-approved disclosure statement in connection with a
plan solicitation after the case has been commenced, prepackaged cases still will be possible. In
that regard, § 1126(b) provides that solicitations made prior to the commencement of the case
may be used after the case has begun if they were made "in compliance with any applicable
nonbankruptcy law [or] rule .. .governing the adequacy of disclosure in connection with such
solicitation" or, in the absence of such compliance, if the solicitation was made after disclosing
adequate information as defined in § 1125 (a)(1). 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
165. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228. "[T]he near absolute freedom" from
disclosure applied only in former chapter XI, not in former chapter X. See text accompanying
notes 154-59 supra.
166. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228. In that regard, in commenting on the
proposed exemption from the federal securities laws in an earlier version of the Act, the Commission had advised Congress that, in its experience, "[b]ankruptcy reorganization ... is a
significant source of entry of new securities into the public trading markets" and "that the
opportunity to create large quantities of securities under an exemption forms an attractive base
for a securities manipulator." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 773, 773 n.79 (1975);
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Serial 27, Part 4) 2201, 2201 n.83 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 201-09 infra, concerning the redistribution of unregistered plan-exchanged
securities pursuant to the Act's securities exemption contained in § 1145.
167. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(b) (Supp. II 1978).
168. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228-29. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(d) (Supp. II
1978); S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 121 (such an agency may "advise the court on the
adequacy of [a] proposed disclosure statement").
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including the Commission, will have the right to initiate an appeal from an
adverse decision, 169 it may "participate in an appeal [taken from such a
ruling] by a party in interest." 170
Also, section 1125(e) provides a "safe harbor" for any person who, "in
good faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of this title," "solicits" for a plan or "participates ... in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase
of a security, offered or sold under the plan."171 Such person "is not liable,
on account of such solicitation or participation, for a violation of any applicable law, [or] rule . . . governing the offer . .. [or] sale . . . of securities."

This provision protects from any potential liability under the federal securities laws those persons who, in "good faith," solicit for a plan. 172 Thus,
for that purpose, the safe harbor provision codifies Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder. 173 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a person would
be subject to liability in a private action for damages for violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 174 and rule 10b-5 thereunder, only if
he or she acted with "scienter." The Court defined scienter as a "mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 175

169. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(d) (Supp. 11 1978). See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at
229 ("The S.E.C .... will not have a right of appeal on the adequacy of disclosure, either in
the role of an advisor to the court in reorganization cases, or in the role of the agency responsible for the enforcement of the securities laws generally"). See also S. REP. No. 95-989, supra
note 55, at 121.
170. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 229.
171. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(e) (Supp. 11 1978). S. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 178(c) (1979)
would extend the safe harbor provision to those soliciting for rejection of a plan.
172. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 229, 231, 409-10; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra
note 55, at 122. Thus, such provisions as §§ 11, 12, and 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 771, 7 7 q (1976), and §§ 10(b) and 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78r (1976), under which liability otherwise would be imposed because of the inadequacy of
disclosure, would facially not appear to be applicable where a court-approved solicitation document is used. But see note 180 infra.
173. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
175. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976). While the Supreme Court,
in Hochfelder, left open the question of whether "scienter" is required in a Commission injunction action, § 1125(e) is an effort to close the door in this limited area of bankruptcy reorganization by requiring a showing of lack of good faith concerning the adequacy of the bankruptcy disclosures, because it provides a safe harbor against SEC injunction as well as against
damage actions. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 230-31. Thus, it would appear
that a higher burden than usual will be imposed on the Commission should it seek to obtain
injunctive relief for conduct concerning § 1125(e) that otherwise allegedly violates the federal
securities laws. Compare the following cases holding that "scienter'" is not required in a Commission injunctive action: SEC v. Aaron, reported in [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9196,800,
at 95,128-31 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. American Realty Trust Co., 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978)
(SEC action for injunctive relief against real estate investment trust). Compare SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976), with SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.
1978) (showing of scienter required).
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The burden of full disclosure under the federal securities laws rests
6
squarely on the issuer of securities and those connected with the offering17
because "the content of the ... statement is within management's [or the
proponent's] control."177 Therefore, the authors submit that a plan proponent or any person who participates in the preparation of the disclosure
statement or in the solicitation also has the burden of providing the court
and the parties with all necessary information so that an informed decision
can be reached as to whether the disclosure statement contains "adequate
information." Because the safe harbor provision is limited to the "good
faith" of a plan proponent and those connected with the preparation of the
disclosure statement, 178 it should "not affect civil or criminal liability for
defects and inadequacies that are beyond the limits of exoneration that good
faith provides." 179 Thus, in cases where a participant in the solicitation can
be shown to have been aware of material information that was not disclosed
to the court and to parties in interest who are asked to reach an informed
decision on a plan proposal, the safe harbor provision should not be available
as a defense. 180

176. See Boruski v. Division of Corp. Fin. of the United States SEC, 321 F. Supp. 1273,
1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1971): "The responsibility for submitting an adequate [registration statement]
that purports to comply with the disclosure and other requirements of the law is upon the
issuer."
177. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976). The Court there also
stated that any "doubts [should] be resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to protect"
[citation omitted]. See also note 186 infra.
178. S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 122.
179. Id. While those participating in drawing up the disclosure statement should "be fair and
sensitive" to the needs of those asked to vote on a plan, they are "not require[d to] . .'. be
clairvoyant." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). Also, the adequacy of the disclosure is to be determined as of the transaction
"and not upon a 20-20 hindsight view long after the event." Spielman v. General Host Corp.,
402 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
180. Courts have held that intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct is sufficient to meet the
"scienter" requirement. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (action by investor for damages resulting from handling of stock
portfolio); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978)
(action by heir against defendant's purchase of stock from estate); Coleco Ind., Inc. v. Berman,
567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978) (action by stock purchasers
for fraud); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 952 (1978) (action by commercial lending institution against former owners of consumer finance company); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th
Cir. 1977) (suit for violation of Securities Exchange Act). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 197-203 (1976). There is no need to show specific intent or willfulness in order to
prove "scienter." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979) (misuse of material non-public information by an employee of a
financial printer in connection with purchase of securities). Cf. United States v. Charnay, 537
F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) (reversed dismissal of indictment for
market manipulation).
Creditors or stockholders who may be injured by fraud in connection with the preparation of
a disclosure statement or the solicitation of plan acceptances are not without remedies. In a case
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'Adequate Information"-What Does It Mean?
With that general background, a discussion of what is "adequate information" is appropriate. "Adequate information," as previously noted, 181 is to be
determined according to a flexible standard depending upon the facts of a
particular case. The phrase refers to
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of
the debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to
make an informed judgment about the plan. 182
Furthermore, an "investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the

relevant class" is defined as one who has:

where the plan has not been confirmed and no distribution has been made, the injured party
should seek relief in the bankruptcy court. Similarly, if relief is sought "at any time before 180
days after the date of the entry of the order of confirmation," 11 U.S.C. app. § 1144 (Supp. II
1978), a party alleging the fraudulent conduct should apply to the bankruptcy court seeking to
revoke the confirmation order. Id. In the event that a plan has not been substantially consummated, see id. § 1101(2) but the confirmation order had been entered more than 180 days from
the date the alleged fraud was discovered, a party should be able to apply to the bankruptcy
court, as a court of equity, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304, 307 (1939), and request
that any further distribution under the plan be enjoined pending the resolution of any issues
raised by the application.
Where, however, confirmation occurs more than 180 days before the discovery of the alleged
fraud and the plan is substantially consummated, a question may arise as to whether the "good
faith" of the participants in the disclosure and solicitation process can be challenged; and, if so,
what is the appropriate court in which to seek relief. We do not believe that the bankruptcy
court's prior finding that the disclosure statement contained "adequate information" may be
used as a defense against a claim that "good faith" was lacking in connection with the process.
Nor, in our view, is a finding of good faith, 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(e) (Supp. II 1978), implicit
(or even contemplated) in the bankruptcy court's finding that a disclosure statement contains
"adequate information." That is so because the burden of providing the court and the parties
with all necessary information for inclusion in that statement rests on the plan proponent or
those who assist in the preparation of the statement (see text accompanying notes 176-79 supra)
and because the court makes no independent investigation of the facts at the time it approves
the disclosure statement. Thus, the question of lack of "good faith" of the participants is necessarily postponed for a subsequent inquiry, if any is required. In those cases in which the bankruptcy court has reserved jurisdiction, 11 U.S.C. app. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1141(c) (Supp. 11 1978), it
may be appropriate to seek relief in that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)-(c) (Supp. 11 1978). But
in any event, a party, including the SEC, may allege the fraud in an action for damages or any
other relief in another forum. See In re Newport Harbor Assocs., reported in [1979] BANKnt. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 67,104, at 77,037 (1st Cir. 1979) (time limitation to revoke confirmation of plan
for fraud is absolute and exclusive). Cf. Bizzel v. Hemingway, 548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977) (suit
for securities fraud and breach of contract).
181. See notes 160-63 supra.
182. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9660 (June 30, 1972), as discussed in note 163 supra.
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(A) a claim or interest with the relevant class;
(B) such a relationship with debtor as the holders of other claims or interests of such class generally have; and
(C) such ability to obtain such information from sources other than the
disclosure required by this section as holders of claims or interests in such
class generally have. 183
Although the Commission's rules relating to disclosure under the federal
securities laws are not per se applicable to the disclosure statement that will
be used in connection with plan solicitations, 184 it should be emphasized
that "[t]he premise underlying [the new reorganization chapter] . . . is the
same as the premise of the securities laws."1 85 In connection with the determination of whether a disclosure statement contains "adequate informa-

tion," the legislative history suggests that something close to the materiality
concept,18 6 the disclosure standard applicable in non-bankruptcy cases,

183. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 227-28; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra
note 55, at 121. This definition is to provide the flexibility in the disclosure standard because
the various classes of creditors may not need "the same level of disclosure"-that is, e.g., trade
creditors presumably do not need as much information as public investors. H.R. REP. No.
95-595, supra note 10, at 226. In that connection, § 1125(c) provides, in pertinent part, that
"different disclosure statements, differing in amount, detail, or kind of information, as between
classes" may be transmitted to different classes. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(c) (Supp. II 1978).
app. § 112 5(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
184. Id. § 1125(d). See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 227-28; S. REP. No. 95-989,
supra note 55, at 121. As noted at note 163 supra, however, it is recognized that a disclosure
statement in compliance with the Commission's proxy rules may be appropriate in certain cases.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228.
A factor that may well have to be considered in connection with the determination of whether
adequate information is being disclosed is the effect of an action that falls within the exceptions
to the automatic stay against commencing or continuing any litigation against the debtor after
the filing of the petition-for example, an action brought "by governmental unit to enforce ...
[its] regulatory power," 11 U.S.C. app. § 362(b)(4) (Supp. II 1978), or to enforce a non-money
judgment previously obtained in such an action, id. § 362(b)(5). Thus, where the SEC has
obtained an injunction because of past deficiencies in disclosure made by an issuer in reports to
investors, the court may very well take a closer look at the proposed disclosure statement and,
especially in cases where the debtor-in-possession is responsible for the disclosure, could require a statement that is in compliance with the Commission's proxy rules.
185. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 224, 226. See discussion in note 161 supra. In
that regard, as pointed out before, the legislative history also states, for example, that "[t]his
change [in the law] is, in large part, attributable to the pervasive effect of the Federal securities
laws and the extraordinary success of the Securities and Exchange Commission in sensitizing
both management and members of the bar to the need for full disclosure .... " 124 CONG. REC.
S17,418 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REc. H11,101 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
186. After recognizing that "[t]he question of materiality ... is an objective one," in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (case arising under rule 14a-9 of
the SEC's proxy rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-9 (1978) (an antifraud provision)), the Supreme
Court held:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote ....
[Materiality]
contemplate[s] . . . a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the cir-
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should be applied. In addition, the definition of the hypothetical reasonable
investor also is suggestive of an analogy to a concept familiar under the federal securities laws-that is, the amount of information that is adequate for
disclosure purposes will depend, among other things, on the investor's
sophistication and access to other sources of information that would be
adequate for making an informed decision about the plan. 187
While the standard for disclosure is a flexible one, section 1125(d) provides that the SEC may be an active participant in the hearing on whether
the disclosure statement contains adequate information 188 and its "arguments, on behalf of the public interest in an orderly securities market, will
undoubtedly be heard and considered by the bankruptcy judges," 189 even
though it cannot initiate an appeal from an adverse determination. 190 Thus,
the Commission can be a constructive force in the development of the case
law as to what constitutes "adequate information," 191 utilizing the expertise
it has gained during the past forty-five years that it has spent administering
the disclosure provisions of the federal securities law. 192 Such a role would
cumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information
made available.
Id. at 449. The TSC holding appears to be similar to the language in § 1125(a)(1) that "adequate
information" is that information which "would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor ... to
make an informed judgment about the plan." 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
187. Compare id. § 1125(a)(2) and H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 226; twth, e.g.,
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953). In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court
held that an issuer's employees who did not have access to information about the company
needed the protections afforded by registration under § 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1976), in connection with an offer of securities to them. See also Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (offerees in a securities transaction must have access
to the type of information that would be disclosed in a registration statement in order for
private placement exemption from registration to be available).
188. Section 1125(d) refers to "agency or official," clearly a reference to the SEC, which is
the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the disclosure requirements of the securities
laws. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(d) (Supp. 11 1978). See also notes 161 & 163 supra.
189. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 228.
190. Id. at 228, 229, 409; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 121. That is a change from
practice under former chapter X, where, despite § 208, the Commission had taken an appeal
from an adverse ruling in a case where it had intervened specially to enforce the federal securities laws. See SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1962) (SEC denied permission to
intervene); Showcase Corp. (E.D. Mich. No. 71-2899), reported in 40 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 129
(1975).
The Commission will, in any event, as in its role as an advisor to the courts under § 208 of
former chapter X and rule 10-210(c), see text accompanying notes 15-31 and 169-70 supra, be
able to "participate in an appeal taken by a party in interest." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra
note 10, at 229, 409.
191. "That standard is a substantive standard. Precisely what constitutes adequate information
in any particular instance will develop on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 409.
192. In former chapter X, the SEC's examination of, and report on, a plan focused on the
valuation of a debtor and whether the plan met the "fair and equitable" standard. Under chap-
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be in the interests of those whose acceptances are solicited,

193

and it also

would assist the bankruptcy court in performing its duties to assure itself
that "adequate information" is being disclosed and prevent the issuance of
spurious securities. 194

Under the flexible disclosure standard, the statement, unlike that under
former chapter X, may be approved "without a valuation of the debtor." 195
But it is recognized that there may be cases in which a valuation will "be

essential to the development of adequate information.

196

Similarly, as pre-

viously noted, the legislative history states that the court need not consider

the report of investigation prior to approving the disclosure statement. 197
ter 11, the Commission's "participation will continue to be important even without a full valuation." Id. at 229.
193. It appears that Congress anticipated such a role in consolidating former chapters X and
XI and shifting from substantive approval of the fairness of a plan to disclosure of adequate
information of the plan provisions. The House Report characterizes this shift as a "compromise
between the strict requirements of the securities laws [on disclosure] and the near-absolute
freedom of the present bankruptcy laws." It refers to two "protections" for public investors.
One is court approval of the disclosure statement, and the other is the "absolute right" of the
SEC to "be heard on whether a disclosure statement contains adequate information." Id. at 228.
See also S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 121. "[A]n agency ... charged with administering cognate [disclosure] laws" is expected "to advise the court on the adequacy of [the] proposed disclosure statement."
194. See Transystems, Inc. (S.D. Fla. No. 71-164-BK-JE) reported in 37 S.E.C. ANN. REP.
199, 200 (1972); In re Barium Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81, 88 (E.D. Mich. 1945), affd 154,
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1946) (proceeding to consider approval of plans submitted by trustee and
bondholder); In re American Dep't Stores Corp., 16 F. Supp. 977, 979-80 (D. Del. 1936) (considered amended plan submitted by a master after original rejected). See also note 166 supra.
195. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1125(b) (Supp. II 1978). H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 227,
409.
196. Id. at 127. Thus, for example, a valuation may be essential in a case where public
investors are offered new securities in exchange for old ones and "in which an entire restructuring of the capitalization of the debtor is attempted." Id.
197. 124 CONG. REC. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124
CONG. REc. H11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
In any event, the information uncovered during the course of an investigation, whether reported before or after plan solicitations are made, should receive the widest possible distribution. The investigative report may disclose facts to parties in interest, such as suggesting that
they have causes of action against individuals formerly associated with the debtor. See Caplin v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972); note 123 supra. Thus, the court's
designation of debenture holders and stockholders to receive a copy of the report or summary
thereof may be essential. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1106(a)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1978), pursuant to which
the court may designate an "entity" to receive that report. As noted above, "entity" includes a
"person," which, in turn, includes an "individual." See note 70 supra.
An example of the type of case in which the SEC may be expected to request that the court
make a broad designation of those persons who should receive the investigative report would be
one where alleged violations of the federal securities laws are uncovered. Because claims against
the debtor based on such alleged violations are to be "subordinated for purposes of distribution
to all claims and interests that are senior or equal to the claim or interest represented by [a]
security," 11 U.S.C. app. § 510(b) (Supp. 11 1978), making available to parties in interest "any
information obtained... as a result of the investigation," Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust
Co., 406 U.S. at 434, could provide significant assistance, for example, in connection with
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But, like the matter of valuation, it can be anticipated that there may be
cases where such a report will be an important factor in the determination of
whether "adequate information" is being provided to parties in interest
when asked to make an informed decision about a plan proposal. Thus, for
example, where a plan contemplates the retention of the debtor's management, any information uncovered during an investigation that reflects adversely upon the management's integrity should be disclosed to those persons who are asked to vote on the plan. 198 Moreover, in cases where no
investigation is made, it may be necessary to disclose that fact as well as the
reason for not conducting any investigation.
It may be expected that early judicial decisions in this area will provide
99
some guidance to the practitioner as to what is "adequate information." 1

discovery sought by alleged defrauded investors who bring actions against other participants in
the alleged violative securities transaction.
198. In addition to questions involving such matters as fraud, waste, and diversion of corporate opportunities, the view here also refers to matters that come under the rubric of corporate
accountability. They would include, for example, previous nondisclosure of any interest of management in corporate transactions (that is, potential conflicts or self-dealing), of the payment of
perquisites to corporate officials, and of questionable and illegal payments, the disclosure of
which would provide the parties in interest with information from which they can assess the
character of management officials to whom the future development of the debtor is to be entrusted. In that connection, courts recently have recognized that "information of improprieties
committed" by corporate management "might be material to investor decisions" concerning the
qualifications of those who exercise stewardship of the corporation. SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829-30 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See also Maldonado v. Flynn, reported in
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,805, at 95, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1979) (remanded for a determination whether the reelection of directors should be nullified because of the false and misleading
impression created by a description in a proxy statement of the amendments to a stock option
plan and the facts concerning the exercise of such options); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enforcement action brought by SEC seeking permanent injunction
against further violations of securities laws by former corporate director). And, fifteen years ago
in Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-74 (1964), the SEC had expressed the view that information reflecting on the quality and reliability of management is material to reaching an informed investment decision.
Furthermore, the investigation may disclose that a company whose securities are publicly
held does not have books and records "which, in reasonable detail, accurately reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b)(2)(A) (1976), added to the Act by the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213 (Dec. 19, 1977). See also in this connection Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979), 16 SEC Docket 1143; "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977: Do You Know This Act Covers Domestic Business Activities?," New York Law Journal
Seminars - Press (1978). In fact, prior to the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, one
court found an accountant liable for aiding and abetting a violation of the Commission's proxy
rules where there was a failure to disclose known deficiencies in the company's internal controls, including its bookkeeping. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 'Inc., reported in [19761977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683, at 90,367, 90,369-70 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See discussion in note 222 infra.
199. As noted previously, it is anticipated that the Commission, with its 45 years of experience in administering the disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws should be a constructive force in connection with judicial interpretation of the phrase "adequate information."
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As is stated in the legislative history, in determining whether a disclosure
statement contains "adequate information," the court should balance the desires of the parties to the case to have an expeditious and successful reor200
ganization with the longer-term goal of "preventing securities frauds."
Need for Close Scrutiny of Disclosure Statements
Section 1145 of the new Act contains an exemption from registration
under the Securities Act for the distribution of certain securities issued pur-

suant to a plan of reorganization or held by a debtor at the time of the filing
of the petition. 20 1 Additionally, the plan offer and sale of securities are not

governed by the proxy requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.202 Because both of these are important public investor protection statutes administered by the SEC, the Commission's role in scrutinizing the issuance of
securities in reorganization cases should have an important bearing on the
plan proposal and its confirmation. In this connection, the SEC's participation may be important, because it presumably would object to confirmation
of a plan that is nothing more than a scheme to avoid the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act. 20 3 Where the principal purpose of the plan is to effect a public distribution of securities through a less
stringent bankruptcy disclosure process than would be the case if the securities were registered under the Securities Act, an objection to confirmation
by the SEC would frustrate the perpetration of such a scheme. In that context, the House Report emphasizes that securities schemes are not to be
effected "through the use of section 1145." 204
200. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
201. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1145 (Supp. II 1978).
202. See text accompanying notes 160-68 supra.
203. See 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(d) (Supp. II 1978), which provides in pertinent part that "on
request of a party in interest that is a governmental unit, the court may not confirm a plan if
the principal purpose of the plan is the avoidance . . . of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976))." This, in effect, codifies the SEC's past practice of opposing confirmation of those plans that appeared to be "motivated primarily by stock market considerations
rather than by any serious desires to rehabilitate a business." E.g., Studio Creative Crafts, Inc.,
(E.D. Va. No. 208-70-A) and Universal Topics, Inc., (D. Md. No. 14243) both reported in 37 SEC
ANN. REP. 202 (1972). Neither of the plans involved in those cases were confirmed, and the
debtors were adjudicated bankrupts. Id.
204. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 418. While the bankruptcy registration exemption was thought necessary to facilitate consummation of reorganization plans, it was not enacted
for the purpose of protecting securities promotional schemes. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRu'TCY
12.03, at 716 n.8 (14th ed. 1978) ("The purpose of § 393 [of former chapter XI was] to facilitate
the offer and consummation of plans, to avoid an undue burden on the debtor, and to prevent

unduly burdensome expense.") See also 6A

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

10.21, at 106-07 (14th

ed. 1978) ("Because of the exemption from the Securities Act of 1933, accorded by § 264 [of
former chapter X], the reorganization court [was] under the duty to scrutinize with care the
securities to be issued in order to prevent the issuance of unsound or deceptive securities."); In
re American Dep't Stores Corp., 16 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1936); In re Barium Realty Co., 62
F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1946). Congress' awareness of the
impact of the issuance of the bankruptcy-related securities, exempt from the registration pro-
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The importance of the SEC's and bankruptcy court's roles in scrutinizing
plan disclosure statements that provide for the issuance of unregistered securities is underscored by the scope and nature of the bankruptcy securities
exemption itself. The purpose of the registration requirement is to "provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate ...
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale
thereof." 20 5 The theory behind an exemption from registration for the distribution of securities issued under a bankruptcy reorganization plan, like
those contained in the Securities Act itself, is that under the circumstances
requiring court scrutiny of the disclosure statement, formal registration
should not be necessary. 2 0 6 However, because the exemption from registration now permits resales of bankruptcy-issued securities, 20 7 protecting the
integrity of the marketplace will be a factor that must be considered. The
debtor's interests20 8 in flexibility and economy must be carefully balanced
against the potential harm to public investors in the open market. 209
CONFIRMATION STANDARDS

Confirmation of a plan of reorganization is a "complex subject." 21 0 Section 1129 reshapes the approach to the adoption of a plan of reorganization

cess, could have on the market is seen in the caution with which it approached an addition to
the exemption from registration for the disposition of a debtor's portfolio securities during a
chapter 11 proceeding. While such unregistered, restricted securities can be disposed of outside
a plan, 11 U.S.C. app. § 1145(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1978), certain conditions must be met in order to
prevent "manipulation schemes" and "selling into the market 'cats and dogs' of a nonreporting
company." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 420.
205. Preamble, Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). See note 161 supra.
206. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 227-28.
207. Section 1145(b) permits creditors and stockholders to resell in the open market securities they have received under a plan and thus cease to be what has been described as being
"captive purchasers." Id. Resales are not unrestricted, though. Unrestricted resales are not
permitted by a person who is or becomes a controlling person or by an "underwriter" as specially defined in § 1145(b). "It is important to note that any creditor with at least 10% of the
securities will be a 'controlling person' and therefore an 'issuer' who will be subject to the
requirements of § 5 regardless of any exemption as an underwriter." H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
supra note 10, at 238.
208. It is said that the provisions governing "redistribution of securities received under the
plan .. . are necessary because the rigidity of the securities laws conflicts with the need for
flexibility in bankruptcy cases." Id. at 237.
209. The House Report stated:
If creditors are permitted to sell securities issued by the debtor under the plan in a
public market without filing a registration statement or supplying a prospectus,
steps should be taken to protect the purchasers of the securities. Because the
debtor may be "going public" for the first time, the market may be void of financial
information concerning the debtor and will certainly be short of information concerning the reorganized debtor.
Id. at 238.
210. 124 CONG. REc. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124
CONG REc. H11,105 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
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that impairs 211 the rights of creditors and shareholders. As such, that section
is one of the principal features for public investors in the Act's reorganization
provisions, and one of the last opportunities to protect the investor. When
viewed in light of the disclosure approach to plan solicitation, where investors make their own informed decisions, the confirmation provisions will require investor vigilance in accepting or rejecting a plan proposal.
Under former chapter X, the "fair and equitable" standard-otherwise
known as the absolute priority rule-was one of the key public investor
protection features of that proceeding. 212 That doctrine 213 essentially required that senior classes be paid in full before junior interests could participate. 214 In some cases, it has been stated that compliance with this requirement effectively eliminated participation by public shareholders where
the debtor's valuation was insufficient to reach that far down. 215
Under former chapter XI, on the other hand, because the confirmation
standard of "best interests of creditors" meant that creditors received more
than in liquidation, a negotiated arrangement usually worked to retain enhanced value for the shareholders at the expense of the unsecured creditors. 216 Thus, public debenture holders under former chapter XI could
receive less than their absolute priority vis-i-vis stockholders. Considering

211. "Impairment" is the new terminology for a claim or interest that is affected by a plan in
the sense that rights are modified and altered in the interest of the reorganization. 11 U.S.C.
app. § 1124 (Supp. 11 1978). As under § 216(6) of former chapter X, a plan must specify "any
class of claims or interests that is not impaired under the plan." Id. § 1123(a)(2).
212. In SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 612 n.ll (1965), the Supreme
Court compared chapters X and XI in this respect, and noted "Chapter X's greater protection
for public investor creditors in this regard."
213. Up until 1952, both chapters X and XI contained this requirement for confirmation. In
that year, it was deleted from chapter XI, leaving the requirement that the arrangement be "for
the best interests of the creditors." "Best interests" meant that the creditors would get more
under the plan than in liquidation, which provided flexibility for negotiating a relative participation under the arrangement between the unsecured creditors and the debtor, representing
shareholders. See notes 155-56 supra.
214. As explained by the Supreme Court, "The words 'fair and equitable' are 'words of art'
which mean that senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones." SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965). A valuation of the debtor was required to determine where the cut-off occurred down the list of priorities. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-22 (1939).
215. The House Report noted that, in 1938, when public investors usually held senior bonds
and corporations were privately owned, the absolute priority rule "prevented abuses of the
public's rights by insiders of a corporation in reorganization." But today the public classes "are
more likely to be subordinated debenture holders and stockholders," and this protection "inures
to the benefit of private creditors," who are "often financing consortiums." In this context, the
Report continues, "[aipplication of the absolute priority rule under Chapter X has more recently
led to the exclusion rather than the protection of the public." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra
note 10, at 222.
216. This was based on the premise that a reorganized going concern was worth more than if
liquidated, and the debtor's plan attempted to keep as much of the excess value for the
shareholders as the debtor's management could negotiate with the official creditors' committee.
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that the debtor was the only one that could propose a plan, creditors had to
negotiate with management for a larger share of the company. 217
Section 1129 of the Act sets forth a comprehensive set of standards the
bankruptcy court must apply when a plan, to which acceptances have been
solicited, is presented for confirmation. 218 Essentially, it applies the former
chapter XI "best interests" test but preserves a "fair and equitable" treatment for dissenting classes of creditors and stockholders who, by requisite
vote, reject the plan. 219 The key provision is section 1129(a)(8), which provides that the court shall confirm a plan if, inter alia, either "each class . . .
2 20
has accepted" or "is not impaired under the plan."
When a plan is accepted by each class, 221 the court must confirm it if
certain other requirements are met, 222 one of which reflects on the absolute
217. The creditor's negotiating posture may have been strengthened somewhat by the threat
of moving for a conversion to chapter X, where a disinterested trustee would be appointed, a
"bargaining tool" the House Report characterized as possessed by the SEC "to extract concessions from a debtor in the formulation of the plan" of arrangement. H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
supra note 10, at 223.
218. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129 (Supp. II 1978).
219. Id. In this respect, a plan is more akin to negotiated, relative priorities, than absolute.
The participation of any particular group would appear to be dependent on the strength of its
legal position and the practicalities of the situation.
220. Id. § 1129(a)(8). This provision "is central to the confirmation standards." H.R. REP. No.
95-595, supra note 10, at 413. Because an unimpaired class is "deemed to have accepted" the
plan, solicitation of acceptances from that class is "not required," 11 U.S.C. app. § 1126(f)
(Supp. II 1978), but a court finding in this regard will be necessary when a dispute over impairment arises. See id. § 1124 (concerning impairment).
221. Creditors must accept by at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims in the class who vote. Shareholders must accept by at least
two-thirds in amount of allowed interests in the class who vote. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1126(c)-(d)
(Supp. II 1978). Because only those voting are used as the denominator, in public investor
classes it is likely that a group of the larger claims or shareholders could control the decision,
which could be a minority of the total class affected.
222. Some of these are generally taken from §§ 216 & 221 of former Chapter X and deal with
management, costs and expenses of administration, and the concept of feasibility, each of which
could have an impact on investor protection. The identity and affiliations of management of the
reorganized company must be disclosed, and their "appointment to, or continuance in, office"
must be "consistent with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public
policy." 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(a)(5) (Supp. II 1978). In passing on the qualifications of prospective management, factors such as incompetence, lack of discretion, active misconduct, inexperience, and connection or affiliation with repudiated personnel or management that "appears
likely to establish new relationships undesirable from the standpoint of the reorganized company

or the public at large" should be considered. 6A
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11.10, at 252

(14th ed. 1978). It has also been said that the court "should probably always reject, as director,
officer, or voting trustee, any person against whom a cause of action has been or is to be
brought by the trustee, examiner or debtor." Id. One of the "chief purposes" of former chapter
X was the "appraisal of the old management" in order to afford "an opportunity to security
holders to acquire more competent or more faithful servants." Id. at 249.
Section 1129(a)(11) is the feasibility requirement, stated in terms of a determination that
"[c]onfirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial
reorganization, of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(a)(11) (Supp. II 1978). Thus, the debtor
should emerge "in a solvent condition and with reasonable prospects of financial stability and
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priority rule. The court must examine the acceptance of the plan by each
impaired class in order to determine if each member of the class has acsuccess." 6A

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $

11.07, at 235 (14th ed. 1978). In Finn v. Childs Co.,

181 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1950), the reorganized company appealed an award of final compensation,
and the court noted
the somewhat bitter dispute as to the drain upon the working capital of the newly
organized company and its present vicissitudes only to suggest that a successful
reorganization placed in jeopardy by high fees allowed can point only to a dreary
round with the debtor emerging from bankruptcy only to re-enter it after the
lawyers are paid.
Id. at 435.
The payment of administration costs, particularly fees, can loom large in a reorganization case
and thus affect the plan's feasibility. Under §§ 241-43 of former chapter X, awards of compensation, which were made at the conclusion of the proceeding, had to be reasonable, reflect the
public interest nature of bankruptcy matters, see, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 432-33 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (appeal from
award of interim fees to trustee), and were not to be made at the same rates prevailing in
private litigation. See, e.g., In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); In re York Int'l Bldg., Inc., 527 F.2d 1061, 1069 (9th
Cir. 1975). In that connection, it had been held that the court should consider such factors as
the time required, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to deal with those
issues, the preclusion of other employment, and the experience and reputation of those involved. See In re First Colonial Corp., 544 F.2d 1299, making applicable to bankruptcy cases
the guidelines laid down in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974), and In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 577 F.2d 1296, 1303 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, the courts
balanced these factors in awarding fees in reorganization cases.
By contrast, under § 328(a) of the Act, professional persons may be retained, with court
approval, at a particular hourly rate or on other reasonable terms (including a retainer). But that
compensation is to be reasonable, taking into account such factors as the nature of the services
and their value, and the actual time necessary, as well as "the cost of comparable services" in
non-bankruptcy cases. 11 U.S.C. app. § 330(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra
note 10, at 329-30. This change is designed to overrule the prior principles of reasonableness
and economy of administration in such cases as Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1968), because it is said that "[n]otions of economy of the estate in fixing fees
are outdated and have no place in a bankruptcy code." 124 CONG. REc. S17,408 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG REC. H11,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). It should be noted that under § 328(a) the court may reduce the
compensation previously agreed upon, if, at the conclusion of the case, "in light of developments unanticipatable at the time" the fees were fixed, it should appear that the compensation
agreement was "improvident." 11 U.S.C. app. § 328(a) (Supp. II 1978).
It may be expected that participants in reorganization cases will seek, and may receive,
higher compensation than in the past. Such awards will have to be reviewed carefully to determine what effect, if any, they will have on the feasibility of reorganization plans. In those cases
where the payment of fees in cash may have an adverse effect on the plan's feasibility, the court
could reduce the cash awards and supplement them with an award of securities for the balance.
See id. § 1145(a)(1)(A), which unlike §§ 393 & 264 of former chapters X and XI, exempts from
registration under the Securities Act the issuance of securities "in exchange for ... a claim for
an administrative expense."
Under former chapter X, in cases where there was insufficient cash to pay all allowed administrative fees and expenses, in some cases securities were issued and treated as a private
placement transaction, exempt under § 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1978). See
Jade Oil & Gas Co., (C.D., Calif. Nos. 17312-F & 17313-F), reported in 39 SEC. ANN. REP. 126
(1974) (applicants allowed more than $10,000 were paid 75% in cash and 25% in newly issued
stock of the reorganized company).
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cepted the plan 2 2 3 or, if not, whether a person rejecting the plan will receive under the plan "not less than the amount" he or she would have received in liquidation. 224 However, unlike the absolute priority rule of
former chapter X, in this situation, an accepting class majority can bind the
dissenting minority members to a distribution differing from that which the
"fair and equitable" standard would otherwise mandate as long as it is not
less than what the minority member would have received if the debtor were
liquidated under the liquidation provisions of chapter 7 of the Act. 225 The
effect of this approach to a plan and its confirmation will have a significant
impact on public classes of debt security holders because they will be bound
to a distribution where only two-thirds in amount and one-half in number of
allowed claims of the class actually voting decide to accept the plan proponent's offer. Thus, the interests of a public investor class may be controlled
by the interests of the few, larger class claimants. 226
It is only with respect to a class voting to reject the plan that a form of
"fair and equitable" treatment may become relevant. Ordinarily, a rejected
plan would fail for confirmation. However, "on request of the proponent of

The SEC "retains a right to file an advisory report [on fees] under section 1109." 124 CONG.
S17,408 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. Hll,092
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Section 330(a)(2) of the Senate Bill, S.
2266, had language specifically referring all applications for compensation and reimbursement in
a case involving a public company to the Commission "for a report" which would be "advisory."
In this regard, the Senate Report commented that "[u]sually, courts have accorded the SEC's
views substantial weight, as representing the opinion of a distinguished agency skilled and experienced in reorganization affairs." S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 55, at 41. Under former
chapter X, the Commission's recommendations on allowances and reimbursement. were accorded "great weight." E.g., In re Farrington Mfg. Co., 540 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1976); In re
Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 432 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1970); In re Coast Investors, Inc., 388 F.2d
622 (9th Cir. 1968); Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1950); In re Arlan's Dep't Stores,
Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Investors Funding Corp., 422 F. Supp.
461 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified, 547 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1976). Cf. SEC v. United Financial Group,
Inc., 404 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D. Or. 1975) (SEC receivership).
223. Based on experience under former law, the authors feel it is highly unlikely that such a
level of acceptance will be obtained from public creditor or shareholder classes.
224. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978). The liquidation inquiry requires the
court to determine the hypothetical distribution in a liquidation under chapter 7 of the Act in
order to confirm the plan.
225. Thus, "[a] particular holder [of a claim or interest] is permitted to accept less than
liquidation value, but his acceptance does not bind the class." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra
note 10, at 412-13. This provision is designed to "insure that the dissenting members of an
accepting class will receive at least what they would otherwise receive under the best interest of
creditors test." 124 CONG. REc. H11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
226. Of some potential protection is 11 U.S.C. app. § 1126(e) (Supp. 11 1978), which permits
the court, upon request of a party in interest, to exclude the vote of a person not voting in good
faith, such as where a voting claimant is also an equity holder who would receive a greater
benefit from the plan as a shareholder than as a claimant because the plan allocates to the
creditor class less than full payment and preserves substantial values for the equity holders (a
result which would not be permissible under the fair and equitable test). See Consolidated Rock
Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
REC.
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the plan," 227 where all of the requirements for confirmation are met except
acceptance by one or more classes, the court must still confirm the plan over
the wishes of a dissenting class if the plan is found to be "fair and equitable"
to each such class. 228 This is known as the "cram down" provision, a term
used for an analogous procedure under former chapter X, 229 which, at the
option of the proponent, provides a means to save the plan despite its rejection. Since it is derived from the fair and equitable public investor protection requirement of that chapter, it may become an important "backstop"
against which any public investor class will initially assess the plan proposal
in making the informed, independent judgment contemplated by the solicitation of consents through the disclosure process. 230
Essentially, the new chapter 11 "fair and equitable" cram down gives a
dissenting class, at the option of the plan proponent, that participation it
would have received had the plan initially been developed, much as a
trustee was required to do under former chapter X where, first, a valuation
of the debtor's business and assets is made, and, then, the resulting value is
distributed from the top priority down in the order of absolute priorities
until it is exhausted. At this point, a pro rata distribution to the last class is
made, and any junior interests are deemed worthless and do not participate
in the reorganized company. 231
If requested by the proponent to confirm despite the rejection, the court
merely applies certain fair and equitable guidelines set out to deal with dissenting secured and unsecured creditor and equity security classes. 232 If
the plan is then found to provide the requisite fair and equitable treatment
for the dissenting class, it must be confirmed. 233 If not, the proponent's

227. This would include the debtor or trustee, or possibly a third party in other situations.
The "court may not rewrite the plan," H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 414, and cannot
confirm unless the proponent requests it to do so. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
228. Id. An additional requirement is that the plan not "discriminate unfairly" with respect to
dissenting classes. This provision is new and is "not derived from the fair and equitable rule or
from the best interests of creditors test. Rather, it preserves just treatment of a dissenting class
from the class's own perspective," H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 417, that is, "that a
class not be unfairly discriminated against with respect to equal classes." Id. at 416 (emphasis
added).
229. Chandler Act, ch. X, §§ 179, 216(7)-(8), 52 Stat. 891, 896 (1938) (repealed 1979).
230. See text accompanying notes 152-68, 175-96 supra. Important principles of disclosure in
a particular case may include the plan proponent's intention to elect the cram down in the event
it is not accepted and an estimate of what the dissenting public class could expect to receive
under a cram down-it could be more or less than offered in the plan.
231. The result is a "partial application of the absolute priority rule . . . applied under [former] chapter X. . . . The important difference is that . . . senior classes [are permitted] to take
less than full payment, in order to expedite or insure the success of the reorganization." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 224. But, it is important to note. that "the fair and equitable
requirement applies only with respect to dissenting classes," 124 CONG. REc. Hl,104 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards), and does not disturb the other classes.
232. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129 (Supp. II 1978).
233. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
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request to confirm is denied. 234 The court cannot rewrite a rejected
plan. 235 While no valuation is essential if all impaired classes accept the
plan, it will "almost always be required" on a cram down request "in order to
determine the value of the consideration to be distributed under the
36
plan." 2
What is fair and equitable treatment is spelled out separately for secured
and unsecured claims -and equity interests. 237 Thus, for example, if all the
members of a dissenting class of public debenture holders will receive under
the plan "property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to
the allowed" amounts of their claims, that is, payment in full, the plan may
still be confirmed. 238 It may also be confirmed where the dissenting class is
not paid in full, provided that "the holder of any [junior] claim or interest"
receives no participation. 239
The importance of adequate and effective public investor representation
and participation in a reorganization case is underscored by the approach to
confirmation followed by the new Act. Under former chapter X, public investors had the independent trustee, the SEC, and the court to ensure them
of a fair and equitable participation under the plan. Thus, they were not left
to negotiate a relative participation on their own. The Act now places this
responsibility on the investors with a "fairness" backstop possible only if the
class dissents and the proponent elects to go forward and not withdraw.

234. Id.
235. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 414.
236. Id. See note 196 supra for consideration of valuation in connection with adequate disclosure.
237. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)(A)-(C) (Supp. II 1978):
238. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
239. Id. The key word is "property," which includes the use of securities to pay the class in
full; in such a situation the court "need only determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the [securities] given the dissenting class of impaired unsecured claims equals the present value
of [their] allowed claims." 124 CONc. REc. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini); 124 CONG. REc. H11,104-05 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
As a further example, an accepting class senior to a dissenting class is allowed to give up
value to a junior intervening class; the plan still remains fair to the dissenting class so long as no
class senior to it has received "more than 100 percent of the amount of its claims," 124 CONG.
REC. H11,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). The senior class may,
however, give up value to a class junior to the dissenting class if the intervening dissenting class
"receives the full amount," as opposed to value, of its claims or interests." Id. at H11,105.
In that connection it is significant to note that § 1126(g) provides that any class whose claims
or interests do not participate under the plan is "deemed not to have accepted" the plan. 11
U.S.C. app.. § 1126(g) (Supp. II 1978). Thus, a class for which no participation is provided in
the plan is automatically treated as a dissenting class. Such a class can only be excluded from
the plan if, after the hearing on confirmation, its exclusion is found to be proper under the fair
and equitable standard (§ 1129(b)). In substance, though not in form, the same result would
have been obtained under the fair and equitable standard in former chapter X. Chandler Act,
ch. X, § 216(8), 52 Stat. 896 (1938) (repealed 1979).
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A duly noticed hearing on confirmation must be held by the court, and
any "party in interest" may file objections. 240 Because the court will previously have seen the plan in connection with its approval of the disclosure
statement, the confirmation hearing likely will focus only on a determination
of whether the standards for confirming the plan are "met." Although the
main inquiries at confirmation will be the plan's acceptance, the liquidation
inquiry, and-when necessary-a fair and equitable determination, the
court must refuse confirmation "on request of a party in interest that is a
governmental unit" when the "principal purpose" of the plan is "avoidance"
of taxes or section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. 241 In that connection, a
plan involving an issuance of securities to public investors probably will be
scrutinized by the SEC's staff. 242
CONCLUSION

With the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress has adopted a new
approach to the means by which investor protections are achieved in business reorganizations of public entities. The prior focus on the disinterested
trustee, the required investigation, the independent formulation of a plan,
and SEC scrutiny and court approval of the plan, now is shifted to an emphasis on investor initiative and vigilance and the disclosure of "adequate
information" in order that the interested parties themselves can reach informed judgments. The flexibility of former chapter XI and the rigidity of
former chapter X have given way to a single reorganization chapter under
which the presumption is that the debtor generally will remain in possession.
However, with disclosure of "adequate information" drawing closer to securities laws concept than was the case under former law, debtor control
over plan formulation and confirmation will have to be balanced against the
protection of public investors. SEC participation in the disclosure process
and prior court approval of the disclosure statement are two important public investor protection features designed to assure continued investor protection and informed judgments.
Because the premise of reorganization cases is the same as the disclosure
premise of the securities laws, the SEC should be expected to play a sig-

240. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1128 (Supp. II 1978). This includes the SEC, for "[u]nder section
1109, the SEC and indenture trustees, even though not true parties in interest, may also object
to confirmation." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 10, at 411.
241. 11 U.S.C. app. § 1129(d) (Supp. II 1978). This provision of § 1129(d) would seem to
emphasize that the issuance of unregistered securities is a means to facilitate a legitimate reorganization of the debtor, and the bankruptcy courts are not to be used to circumvent the investor protection policy of the Securities Act, such as the scheme involved in SEC v. Century Inv.
Transfer Corp., reported in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,232
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1971).
242. See text accompanying notes 176-98 supra with respect to adequate disclosure.
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nificant role.in assisting the court in that regard, primarily as a constructive
force in securing adequate disclosure to public investors. Thus, the Commission will be able to benefit the investor through the wide experience it has
gained over the years in administering the securities laws.

